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A truck driver with a back problem is disabled under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) because the back problem substantially limits him in the
major life activity of reproduction.' His back problem also renders him unable to
perform the lifting required in his current job.2 Does the duty of reasonable
accommodation require his employer to transfer him to a vacant position that
involves no lifting?3

* Assistant Professor, Georgia State University College of Law. B.A., Michigan State University;
J.D., Vanderbilt University School of Law. I would like to thank my colleagues Mary Radford and
Wendy Hensel for their helpful comments.

1. See Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 339 F.3d 682, 686 (8th Cir. 2003).
2. Id.
3. See id. at 684, 686-87.
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An office worker with diabetes is disabled under the ADA because her diabetes
substantially limits her in the major life activity of eating.4 Her diabetes caused her
to develop a vision impairment called background retinopathy.5 Does the duty of
reasonable accommodation require her employer to provide her with a device to
enlarge the text on her computer screen?6
The ADA includes in its definition of prohibited employment discrimination
"not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability."'7 Courts and
scholars have devoted considerable attention to several parts of this statutory
language, exploring the meaning of "disability," "qualified," and "reasonable
accommodation." Receiving less judicial scrutiny-and no scholarly scrutiny-is
the meaning of "limitations" in the ADA's description of the duty of reasonable
accommodation. What limitations faced by a disabled individual must an employer
accommodate?
The ADA differs from other statutes prohibiting employment discrimination in
two main respects. First, the statute limits its protected class to qualified individuals
with disabilities, generally meaning individuals who have a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities but are able to
perform the essential functions of a particular job with or without reasonable
accommodation.' Second, the statute's duty of reasonable accommodation requires
more than mere equal treatment of disabled individuals; employers must make
reasonable adjustments to both the workplace and the disabled employee's job to
provide protected individuals an equal opportunity to succeed in the workplace.9
A recent line of cases, best represented by the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Felix v. New York City Transit
Authority, 0 reads these statutory provisions together, restricting the scope of the
duty of reasonable accommodation. The Felix court held that employers need to
accommodate only those limitations causally connected to the employee's
substantially limited major life activity." If the requested accommodation is
unrelated to the substantially limited major life activity that brought the employee
within the ADA's protected class, the employer is not required to provide it, even
if the employee needs the accommodation because of another limitation caused by
the disability."
Is the Felix limit on the limitations an employer must accommodate an
appropriate interpretation of the scope of the duty of reasonable accommodation

4. See Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916, 926 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that an individual
with diabetes may be substantially limited in the major life activity of eating).
at 919.
5. See id.
6. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE

ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 39 (2002),

available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html ("Since the retinopathy is a
consequence of the diabetes (an ADA disability), the request must be granted unless undue hardship
can be shown").
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. 324 F.3d 102 (2dCir. 2003).
11. Id. at 107.

12. Id.
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under the ADA? The duty of reasonable accommodation is a critical component of
the ADA's protections, requiring employers to view their standard workplace
structures and policies-developed based on a norm of a worker without physical
or mental impairments-as contingent. Interpreting the scope of the duty of
reasonable accommodation too narrowly will thwart Congress's goal of equal
employment opportunity for individuals with disabilities. On the other hand, courts
have frequently stated that the ADA's requirement of reasonable accommodation
should result in a level playing field for individuals with disabilities, rather than
providing them an unfair advantage through preferential treatment." Requiring
employers to accommodate any limitation flowing from an employee's
disability-even when the limitation is minor and shared by other, nondisabled
employees-could arguably grant the disabled employee preferential treatment.
This Article explores whether the Felix limit on the limitations an employer
must accommodate represents the appropriate balance between guaranteeing equal
opportunity and avoiding unwarranted preferential treatment for individuals with
disabilities. Part II outlines the limited class protected by the ADA and the statute's
duty of reasonable accommodation. Part III describes both the Felix district and
appellate court decisions and critiques the reasoning of both courts. Part IlI then
discusses judicial decisions rejecting as well as following Felix.The latter category
includes Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc.,' 4 a case presenting a strong argument
that-unless the Felix5 limit on limitations applies-the plaintiff will receive
preferential treatment.'
Part IV assesses the Felix limit on limitations in light of the concern about
preferential treatment, considering lessons from the debate over whether there is a
duty to accommodate plaintiffs who are only regarded as disabled and the
implications of US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,6 the only Supreme Court decision
interpreting the duty of reasonable accommodation. Based on this guidance-and
on insight from the recent scholarship highlighting the similarities between the duty
of reasonable accommodation and Title VII's prohibition of disparate impact
discrimination-this Article rejects the Felix rule. The duty of reasonable
accommodation should not encompass only those limitations causally connected to
an individual's substantially limited major life activity. This Article contends,
however, that the duty of reasonable accommodation should apply only when there
is a substantial conflict between the individual's disability-related limitation and the
challenged workplace practice or structure. Part V concludes by discussing the
practical dangers of Felix and its progeny.

13. See infra note 202.
14. 339 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2003).
15. Id. at 687.
16. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
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THE

ADA:

PROVIDING SIGNIFICANT PROTECTION TO A LIMITED PROTECTED

CLASS

A.

LimitedProtectedClass andthe Catch-22 of "Disability"and "Qualified"

Unlike Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which does not limit its
protection to members of certain classes, 17 the ADA protects only qualified
individuals with disabilities from discrimination because of disability. 8 Title I of
the ADA defines "qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires."' 9 An individual has a disability within the meaning of the ADA if he or she
has "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of [his
or her] major life activities," "a record of such an impairment," or is "regarded as
having such an impairment."20
The definition of disability turns on the meaning of two phrases: "substantially
limits" and "major life activities."" Courts have interpreted both phrases narrowly,
excluding many individuals with physical or mental impairments from the ADA's
protected class.22 However, the Supreme Court's first decision interpreting the
ADA, Bragdon v. Abbott,23 adopted a broad view of what constitutes a major life
activity and when that activity is substantially limited.24 Noting that the term
"major" indicates "'comparative importance"' and "'significance," 25 the Court held
that reproduction is a major life activity because "[r]eproduction and the sexual
dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process itself."26 The Court
concluded, moreover, that the plaintiff-who had asymptomatic HIV-was

17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e- I to -17 (2000). See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 504
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "every single individual in the work force" is protected by
Title VIH); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1976) (holding that Title
VII's prohibition of race discrimination is enforceable by whites as well as blacks); Brill v. Lante
Corp., 119 F.3d 1266, 1270 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that all men and women are members of the
protected class in sex discrimination cases).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
19. Id. § 12111(8).
20. Id. § 12102(2).
21. In most cases, the parties do not dispute whether the plaintiff has a physical or mental
impairment. The ADA does not define the term "impairment," but regulations issued by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) provide that a physical or mental impairment includes
"[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one
or more" specified body systems, or"[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation,
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(h)(l)-(2) (2004).
22. According to the Supreme Court, the phrases "substantially limits" and "major life activities"
must be "interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled." Toyota Motor
Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
23. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
24. Id. at 639, 641.
25. Id. at 638 (quoting Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939, 940 (1st Cir. 1997)).
26. Id. In light of "[t]he breadth of the term," the Court rejected the defendant's argument that
only activities with a "public, economic, or daily dimension" could be major life activities. Id.
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substantially limited in the major life activity of reproduction because "[tihe Act
addresses substantial limitations on major life activities, not utter inabilities." 2
In subsequent cases, however, the Court took a stricter view of major life
activities and substantial limitation. In Sutton v. UnitedAir Lines, Inc.,28 the Court
held that when determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life
activity, courts must consider the impairment in its corrected or mitigated state.29
The Court also expressed doubt regarding the viability of characterizing "working"
as a major life activity,3" and held that an individual is substantially limited in
working only if the impairment prevents the individual from working in a broad
class of jobs.3' In Toyota Motor Manufacturing,Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams,32 the
Court held that, to be substantially limiting, an impairment must "prevent[] or
severely restrict[]" the performance of the major life activity.33 Without referencing
its holding inBragdonthat reproduction is a major life activity,34 the Court reasoned
that "major life activities" are "those activities that are of central importance to daily
life."35
This narrow approach to the definition of disability has continued in the lower
courts. Courts generally agree that the activities listed by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in its regulations-"caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working"3-are major life activities,37 and many courts have found thinking,
eating, and sleeping to be major life activities as well.3" However, courts have
rejected driving as a major life activity, 9 some courts have concluded that
27. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998). The Court noted that conception and
childbirth-while not impossible for an individual with HIV-"are dangerous to the public health" and
concluded this limitation "meets the definition of a substantial limitation." Id.
28. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
29. Id. at 482. Accordingly, individuals whose impairments are corrected by measures such as
medication are unprotected from discrimination because oftheir impairments unless they can show their
employer regarded them as disabled or treated them differently because of a record of disability.
30. Id. at 492.
31. Id. Moreover, even if an employer rejects an applicant for employment because of the
applicant's impairment, the applicant will not necessarily succeed in establishing that the employer
regarded him or her as substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Rather, to make such
a showing, the applicant must prove that the employer regarded him or her as unable to perform a broad
class ofjobs. Id. at 494-95.
32. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
33. Id. at 198.
34. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998).
35. Toyota MotorMfg., Ky., Inc., 534 U.S. at 197.
36. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2004).
37. See, e.g., EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 306 F.3d 794, 801 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that
seeing is a major life activity); Emerson v. N. States Power Co., 256 F.3d 506, 511 (7th Cir. 2001)
(holding that learning and working are "established major life activities"); Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d
298, 312 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that breathing is a major life activity).
38. See, e.g., Brown v. Cox Med. Ctrs., 286 F.3d 1040, 1044-45 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that
"the ability to perform cognitive functions" is a major life activity); Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n,
239 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that "'caring for oneself'" is a major life activity)
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)); Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916, 923 (7th Cir. 2001)
(holding that eating is a major life activity); Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999)
(holding that sleeping is a major life activity).
39. See, e.g., Chenoweth v. Hillsborough County, 250 F.3d 1328, 1329-30 (1lth Cir. 2001)
(stating that "[i]t would at the least be an oddity that a major life activity should require a license from
the state, revocable for a variety of reasons including failure to insure"); Colwell v. Suffolk County
Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635,643 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that plaintiff "identified a number of activities
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concentrating is not a major life activity,40 and two federal appellate courts have
suggested that interacting with others is not a major life activity.4 Moreover, some
courts have adopted exacting standards for determining when individuals are
42
substantially limited in performing various major life activities, such as walking,
lifting, 43 and sleeping." Claims based on the major life activity of working also
rarely45succeed, due to the difficulty of proving inability to work in a broad class of
jobs.
Plaintiffs who satisfy the disability requirement for membership in the ADA's
protected class often risk not satisfying the other requirement: that they are qualified
for the position in question,46 meaning they are able to perform the essential
functions ofthe position with or without reasonable accommodation.47 Both courts
and commentators have noted this Catch-22 between "disability" and "qualified":

that cannot be deemed major league, such as driving").
40. Linser v. Ohio Dep't of Mental Health, No. 99-3887, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 25644, at *9
(6th Cir. Oct. 6, 2000) (holding that "concentrating is not a major life activity"); Pack, 166 F.3d at
1305 ("Concentration may be a significant and necessary component of a major life activity, such as
working, learning, or speaking, but it is not an 'activity' itself.").
41. Davis v. Univ. ofN.C., 263 F.3d 95, 101 n.4 (4th Cir. 2001) (expressing "some doubt" as to
whether "the ability to get along with others is a major life activity"); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc.,
105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997) (suggesting that getting along with others is not a major life activity
because "[t]he concept ...is remarkably elastic, perhaps so much so as to make it unworkable as a
definition"). The Second and Ninth Circuits, however, have held that interacting with others is a major
life activity. See Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 202 (2d Cir. 2004); McAlindin v. County
of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 1999).
42. McCoy v. USF Dugan, Inc., 42 F. App'x 295, 297 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding as a matter of
law that an individual with multiple sclerosis-whose equilibrium was affected during flare-ups of her
condition, requiring her to hold onto the wall when walking and causing her to fall at times-was not
substantially limited in the major life activity of walking); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105-08
(3d Cir. 1996) (holding as a matter of law that an employee with degenerative hip disease was not
substantially limited in the major life activity of walking, even though he walked with a limp, could
walk only a limited distance, had trouble climbing stairs, and, according to his physician, had "great
difficulty in walking around").
43. Marinelli v. City of Erie, Pa., 216 F.3d 354, 363-64 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that an
employee's inability to lift more than ten pounds "does not render him sufficiently different from the
general population such that he is substantially limited in his ability to lift").
44. Boerst v. Gen. Mills Operations, Inc., 25 F. App'x 403, 407 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Getting
between two and four hours of sleep a night, while inconvenient, simply lacks the kind of severity we
require of an ailment before we will say that the ailment qualifies as a substantial limitation under the
ADA."); Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1306 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff who
experienced periods of sleep disruption-such as sleeping only two or three hours per night-was not
substantially limited in the major life activity of sleeping).
45. In one noteworthy case, the District of Columbia Circuit overturned a jury verdict in favor
of a plaintiff whose degenerative disc disease limited the amount he could lift to no more than 20
pounds, who lacked a high school diploma, and whose entire job history consisted of heavy labor. The
court overturned the jury verdict because he "offered no significantly probative evidence... of the
number and types of positions available in his local job market." Duncan v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 240 F.3d 1110, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc). Because the plaintiff failed "to
demonstrate that his back impairment substantially limited his ability to work," the court concluded that
he was not disabled under the ADA. Id. See also Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101
F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that a "twenty-five pound lifting limitation-particularly when
compared to an average person's abilities--does not constitute a significant restriction on one's ability
to lift, work, or perform any other major life activity").
46. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (prohibiting "discriminat[ion] against aqualified individual with
a disability").
47. Id. § 12111(8) (defining "qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires").
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an individual's impairment must be limiting enough that it constitutes a disability,
yet not so limiting that it renders the individual unable to perform the essential
functions of his or her job. 8 Faced with evidence that a plaintiff performed his or
her job well, some courts have concluded that the plaintiff must not have an actual
disability.49 The conflict inherent in demonstrating disability while remaining
qualified for one's position may be particularly formidable for plaintiffs asserting
substantial limitation in the major life activities of thinking" and interacting with
others. 5

48. See, e.g., Calero-Cerezo v. United States Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6,22-23 (st Cir. 2004)
(noting the "conundrum" of the law requiring "the individual to be both substantially limited and
reasonably functional"); Oliva v. Pride Container Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 907, 911 (N.D. 111.2000)
(statifig that plaintiff "falls into this catch-22 situation faced by ADA plaintiffs, i.e. the difficult task
of proving that they are sufficiently impaired to be considered disabled yet still able to perform the
essential duties of the job"); Jonathan Brown, Defining Disabilityin 2001: A Lower Court Odyssey,
23 WHITTIER L. REV. 335, 381 (2001) (noting that "[t]he two requirements-showing that one is both
disabled and qualified-stand in tension with one another and create a catch-22 for plaintiffs"); Chai
R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability under FederalAnti-DiscriminationLaw: What Happened?
Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. J. 91, 160 (2000) (referring to
the "'catch-22.' facing plaintiffs who "must prove that their impairments (even with mitigating devices
or medication) cause a substantial limitation in some life activity, and yet, at the same time, do not
make them unqualified for the jobs they seek").
49. See, e.g., Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1254 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a
plaintiff with depression and obsessive-compulsive disorder was not substantially limited in the major
life activity of sleeping because he presented "no evidence that his sleep problems made it difficult for
him to go to work and do his job well or affected his overall health in a severe or permanent manner");
Olson v. Gen. Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 953 (3d Cir. 1996) (concluding that plaintiff s "ability
to function normally despite what appear to be serious psychological and emotional
problems.... ironically establishes that he was not substantially limited in a major life activity").
50. Courts have held that for individuals to be substantially limited in the major life activity of
thinking, an impairment must prevent or severely restrict them from thinking. Collins v. Prudential Inv.
& Ret. Servs., 119 F. App'x 371, 374-75 (3d Cir. 2005). Based on this standard, one court concluded
that a plaintiff who, following a serious head injury, "was diagnosed with traumatic brain injury with
cognitive impairments, including reduced short term memory, reduced problem solving capability, and
extended mental processing time" was not disabled. Mulholland v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, Inc., 11 AD
Cases 1233, 1235, 1240-41 (W.D. Mich. 2001). See also Doyal v. Okla. Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492,
495, 498 (10th Cir. 2000) (concluding that the plaintiff who had major depression and anxiety attacks
was not substantially limited in thinking, despite the fact that she was discharged due to "her inability
to make decisions and her lapses of memory, judgment, and confidentiality" and despite her observed
difficulty "making even simple decisions"). But see Head v. Glacier Nw., Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1057,
1061 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the plaintiff who testified-without medical evidence-that his
bipolar disorder and/or depression caused him to be unable to stay focused for more than brief periods
of time and limited his short-term memory, "alleged sufficient evidence to demonstrate a substantial
impairment in the major life activity of thinking"). Courts have reasoned, moreover, that plaintiffs who
perform theirjobs successfully cannot be substantially limited in thinking. Collins, 119 F. App'x at 376
(affirming a directed verdict in favor of the defendant employer on the ground that plaintiff did not have
a disability because "her testimony clearly shows that her claimed life-long ADI-D/ADD affliction did
not [a]ffect her ability to successfully engage in a wide variety of professional and community
activities").
51. Case law suggests that an impairment substantially limits the major life activity of interacting
with others only when it renders the plaintiff completely unable to engage in such interaction. See, e.g.,
Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 203 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that a plaintiff is "'substantially
limited' in 'interacting with others"' only "when the impairment severely limits the plaintiffs ability
to connect with others, i.e., to initiate contact with other people and respond to them, or to go among
other people-at the most basic level of these activities" and that "a plaintiff whose basic ability to
communicate with others is not substantially limited but whose communication is inappropriate,
ineffective, or unsuccessful" does not satisfy the standard); Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375
F.3d 266, 275 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that a plaintiff with PTSD was not substantially limited in
interacting with others even though "'she avoid[ed] making friends,"' could only "'make a minimal
effort [at having] a social life,"' and suffered intermittent episodes in which she was completely unable
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In light of the Catch-22 between "disability" and "qualified," some
commentators have argued that plaintiffs should be strategic in selecting an
arguably substantially limited major life activity and, in particular, avoid relying on
the major life activity of working.12 Commentators have appeared to assume,
.however, that once a plaintiff falls within the ADA's protected class the plaintiff
could access all of the statute's protections against disability discrimination,
including the duty of reasonable accommodation.53 They expressed no concern that
the plaintiffs choice of asserted major life activity would restrict the plaintiffs
ability to access such protection.
B. A Broader Understandingof Discrimination: The Duty of Reasonable
Accommodation
As discussed above, the ADA protects far fewer people from discrimination
because of their impairments than Title VII protects from discrimination because
of their race or sex. One oft-asserted reason for the ADA's limited coverage is that

to interact with others); Bell v. Gonzales, No. Civ. A. 03-163 (JDB), 2005 WL 691865, at *8 (D.D.C.
Mar. 25, 2005) (holding that a plaintiff with Tourette's Syndrome, whose "visible and audible tics
cause some people to avoid or ridicule him, people often regard him as 'strange,' and co-workers have
often misinterpreted his words, gestures, and behaviors as rude, dismissive, aggressive, nasty, and
controlling," was not substantially limited in interacting with others because he "has the basic ability
to communicate and interact with others in an objective mechanical sense"). But see Head,413 F.3d
at 1060-61 (holding that a plaintiff who testified that his bipolar disorder, depression, or both, caused
him to "avoid[] crowds, stores.... doctor's appointments" and even "telephone interaction... alleged
sufficient evidence to demonstrate a substantial impairment in the major life activity of interacting with
others"). Plaintiffs who are completely unable to interact with others, however, are likely to be qualified
for few jobs. See, e.g., Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 765 (6th Cir. 1997) ("The ability to
get along with coworkers and customers is necessary for all but the most solitary of occupations.");
Boldini v. Postmaster Gen., 928 F. Supp. 125, 131 (D.N.H. 1995) (stating that "essential to the
adequate performance of any job is the ability of an employee to accept and follow instructions and
refrain from contentious arguments and insubordinate conduct with supervisors, co-employees or
customers"). See also Wendy F. Hensel, Interactingwith Others: A MajorLife Activity Under the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct?, 2002 WIs. L. REv. 1139, 1188 (noting that plaintiffs relying on the
major life activity of interacting with others "are thus placed in an unenviable Catch-22: if they are
disabled, they are not qualified, and if they are qualified, they are not disabled").
52. Brown, supra note 48, at 382 (noting that the Catch-22 is particularly problematic "for
plaintiffs claiming that they are restricted only in the major life activity of working"); Feldblum, supra
note 48, at 145-46 (asserting that the plaintiff in a particular case should have claimed substantial
limitation in the major life activity of writing, rather than that of working); id. at 161 (suggesting that
individuals with diabetes may be substantially limited in the major life activity of eating).
53. See Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment
DiscriminationLaw, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 3, 22 (2005) (stating that once a plaintiff proves she is
disabled and qualified, the plaintiff "is within the ADA's protected class and ... the employer is
required to redesign workplace policies, practices, equipment, and procedures"); Samuel Issacharoff
& Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law
Accommodate the Americans with DisabilitiesAct?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307, 317 (2001) (stating that the
ADA "direct[s] that the finding of a disability affecting a major life activity triggers a duty of
reasonable accommodation"); Erica Worth Harris, ControlledImpairments under the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct: A Searchfor the Meaning of "Disability," 73 WASH. L. REv. 575, 586 (1998)
(suggesting that once a plaintiff falls within the ADA's protected class, the plaintiff is entitled to "the
benefits of'reasonable accommodation"); BrianR. Gin, GeneticDiscrimination:Huntington's Disease
and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1406, 1413 (1997) ("If an employee or
applicant belongs to a protected class, the employer must offer 'reasonable accommodations' that will
enable the individual to perform the essential functions of the job-unless such accommodations will
cause the employer to suffer 'undue hardship."').
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the ADA demands more of employers than Title VII. 54 Both statutes prohibit
discrimination,55 but the ADA defines prohibited discrimination as including the
failure to reasonably accommodate the limitations of disabled individuals. 56
Employers cannot avoid liability under the ADA simply by treating all employees
the same; sometimes employers must take the limitations of an individual with a
disability into account and alter the workplace or the job accordingly."
The ADA defines "reasonable accommodation" broadly-including both
physical and nonphysical changes to the work environment. 58 The statute provides
that reasonable accommodation may involve
making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities; and job restructuring,
part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant
position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices,
appropriate adjustment or modification of examinations, training
materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or
interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals
with disabilities.5

9

Other than these examples of possible reasonable accommodations, the statute does
not provide guidance as to when a particular accommodation is or is not reasonable.
The ADA does contain, however, an outer limit on the duty of reasonable
accommodation in the concept of "undue hardship." An employer is not required
54. See Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 53, at 358 (arguing that the Supreme Court's
"narrowing of the definition of 'disabled' may prove the easiest and most effective way for the Court
to limit the seemingly unfathomable potential sweep of ADA claims" due to the duty of reasonable
accommodation). Even Susan Stefan, who has been very critical of courts' narrow interpretations of
the definition of disability, acknowledges that "[t]he substantial limitation requirement makes sense
as a parallel to the reasonable accommodation requirement imposed on employers. If employers must
spend money or readjust their policies and practices, then there is an understandable incentive to
reasonably limit the number of people who can assert such claims." SUSAN STEFAN, HOLLOW
PROMISES: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 88 (2002).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000); id. § 12112(a).
56. Three provisions of the ADA embody the duty of reasonable accommodation. The
determination of whether one is "qualified" includes an inquiry into reasonable accommodation: the
individual must be able to perform the essential functions of the position "with or without reasonable
accommodation." Id. § 12111(8). Moreover, as part of the statute's prohibition of disability
discrimination, the ADA prohibits: (1) "not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical
or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability... unless [the employer]
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [its]
business," id. § 12112(b)(5)(A), and (2) "denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or
employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need
of [the employer] to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental impairments of the
employee or applicant," id. § 12112(b)(5)(B).
57. See Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willbom, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace
Disabilities,44 WM. &MARYL. REv. 1197, 1199-1200 (2003) (explaining that "discrimination under
the ADA means something quite distinct from what it means under Title VII" because the "distinctive
thrust [of the ADA] is a 'difference' model, requiring employers to treat individuals with disabilities
differently and more favorably than others"); Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities,
Discrimination,andReasonableAccommodation,46 DUKEL.J. 1,2-3 (1996) (noting that "unlike Title
VII, the ADA also requires employers to take some disabilities into account by providing 'reasonable
accommodations' to disabled workers who request them").
58. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000).
59. Id.
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to make a reasonable accommodation if the employer "can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [its]
business."6 ° Undue hardship is defined as "an action requiring significant difficulty
or expense," viewed in light of "the nature and cost of the accommodation," as well
as specific factors relevant to the particular employer, such as its overall size and
financial resources and the size and financial resources of the facility in question.6 '
In contrast to its multiple decisions interpreting the definition of disability, the
Supreme Court has decided only one case interpreting the duty of reasonable
accommodation, US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett.62 In Barnett,the Court resolved the
specific question of whether the duty of reasonable accommodation required an
employer to reassign a disabled employee-unable, by reason of his disability, to
perform his current job-to a vacant position if the employer's seniority system
granted other employees superior rights to bid for the job in question. 63 The Court
held that the duty of reasonable accommodation ordinarily does not require
employers to transfer disabled employees to vacant positions in conflict with the
provisions of a seniority system." In making this decision, the Court clarified that
the term "reasonable" functions as a limit on the duty of employers to accommodate
disabled employees. 65 A plaintiff must show that an accommodation is reasonable
"ordinarily or in the run of cases"; if a plaintiff makes such a showing, the employer
can attempt to prove "special... circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship
in the particular circumstances. 66
Lower court decisions generally have provided little guidance on the scope of
the duty of reasonable accommodation. Rather than explaining what makes a
particular accommodation reasonable, courts have held that certain accommodations
requested by plaintiffs are unreasonable as a matter of law, such as reassigning the
plaintiffto a different supervisor' and providing a leave of absence for an indefinite
period.6' Two appellate court decisions, however, are more instructive on the
boundaries of the duty of reasonable accommodation, holding that courts must

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
Id. § 12111(10)(A)-(B).
535 U.S. 391, 393 (2002).
Id. at 393-94.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 400. TheBarnettCourt rejected theplaintiffs argument that "reasonable" simply meant

"effective," rendering the affirmative defense of undue hardship as the only limit on an employer's duty
to provide effective accommodations to a disabled employee. Id. at 399-400. The Court noted that "[i]t
is the word 'accommodation,' not the word 'reasonable,' that conveys the need for effectiveness"
because "[a]n ineffective 'modification' or 'adjustment' will not accommodate a disabled individual's
limitations." Id. at 400.
66. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401-02 (2002).
67. See, e.g., Coulson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 31 F. App'x 851, 858 (6th Cir. 2002)
(holding that transferring the plaintiff"so that he will not be required to work with certain other people"
is not a required reasonable accommodation); Kennedyv. Dresser Rand Co., 193 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir.
1999) (holding that assigning the plaintiff to a different supervisor is not a required reasonable
accommodation).
68. See, e.g., Wood v. Green, 323 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that a leave of
absence for an indefinite period is not a reasonable accommodation because the ADA only "covers
people who can perform the essential functions of their jobs presently or in the immediate future");
Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201 F.3d 718, 727 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that "when the requested
accommodation has no reasonable prospect of allowing the individual to work in the identifiable future,
it is objectively not an accommodation that the employer should be required to provide").
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balance the costs and benefits of a proposed accommodation in determining whether
it is reasonable.69
Even though there may be a cost-benefit limit on the scope of the duty of
reasonable accommodation, and even though courts have held that some
accommodations are unreasonable as a matter of law, it is important to recognize
the significance of the duty and its utility to disabled employees. Outside the context
of the ADA, employees generally must take jobs and workplaces as they find
them.70 If a worker can perform a job only if the employer provides special
equipment or an adjustment in policies, the employer is free to fire or refuse to hire
that worker unless the worker is a qualified individual with a disability.7 ' But if the
worker falls within the ADA's protected class, the duty of reasonable
accommodation may require the employer to provide the special equipment or
adjust the policy.72 Moreover, even if a disabled worker is unable to perform all of
the functions ofthejob, the employer still must accommodate the worker byjudging
him or her based solely on the worker's ability to perform the job's essential
functions. 73 Finally, even if the disabled worker is unable--despite reasonable
accommodation-to perform the essential functions of the current position, the

69. Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995) ("'Reasonable' is a
relational term: it evaluates the desirability of a particular accommodation according to the
consequences that the accommodation will produce."); Vande Zande v. Wisc. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d
538,542-43 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that the duty of reasonable accommodation does not require even
extremely large and wealthy employers, which would have difficulty pleading undue hardship, "to
expend enormous sums in order to bring about a trivial improvement in the life of a disabled
employee"); see Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of DisabilityAccommodations, 53
DuKE L.J. 79, 86 (2003) (noting that while appellate courts generally have provided little guidance on
the scope of the duty of reasonable accommodation, "a pair of opinions by Judges Posner and
Calabresi" are two exceptions). Just as the Supreme Court did seven years later in Barnett,see 535 U.S.
at 399-400, the Vande Zande court rejected the plaintiffs argument that reasonable only means "apt
or efficacious," such that "[a]n accommodation is reasonable... when it is tailored to the particular
individual's disability." Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542. Rather, Judge Posner, writing for the court, noted
that "'reasonable' may be intended to qualify (in the sense of weaken) 'accommodation,' in just the
same way that ... the duty of 'reasonable care,' the cornerstone of the law of negligence, requires
something less than the maximum possible care." Id.
70. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 57, at 9 (noting that Title VII "essentially takes jobs as it
finds them," such that "[t]he failure to undertake positive steps to revamp the job or the environment
does not constitute discrimination").
71. See id. at 9 (contrasting the ADA, which "declares it illegal to deny an individual an
employment opportunity by failing to take account of her disability when taking account of it-in the
sense of changing the job or the physical environment of the workplace-would enable her to do the
work," with Title VII, which "defines discrimination in a negative sense: employment practices are
unlawful only if they prevent individuals from doing the job as the employer defines it").
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2000) (listing "acquisition or modification of equipment or
devices" and "appropriate adjustment or modifications of... policies" as examples of reasonable
accommodations); Skerski v. Time Warner Cable Co., 257 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that
the duty of reasonable accommodation may have required the employer to provide the plaintiff-who
was unable to climb due to a panic and anxiety disorder-with a bucket truck for use during overhead
work); Nawrot v. CPC Int'l, 259 F. Supp. 2d 716, 725-26 (N.D. 111. 2003) (concluding that adjusting
the workplace break policy, by providing the diabetic plaintiff extra breaks to allow him to check his
blood sugar levels and administer insulin, may be a reasonable accommodation).
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000) (providing that individuals with a disability are "qualified"
if they, "with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires"); Hamlin v. Charter Twp. ofFlint, 165 F.3d
426, 429-30 (6th Cir. 1999) (upholding the jury's verdict that the fire department violated the ADA
by firing the assistant fire chief who was unable to engage in front-line firefighting because there was
"a genuine issue as to whether firefighting [was] an essential function of the position").
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ADA lists "reassignment to a vacant position" as a possible reasonable
accommodation.74

The duty of reasonable accommodation grants considerable rights to individuals
falling within the ADA's protected class. However, the exact scope of those rights,
according to several commentators, "remains the great unsettled question under the
ADA. 75 Unsurprisingly, given this background, some courts have attempted to set
boundaries on the duty of reasonable accommodation.76 Some of these courts have
set their boundaries not based on the meaning of "reasonable," but rather on the
meaning of "limitations." The holdings of these courts present serious obstacles for
some plaintiffs attempting to avoid the Catch-22 between "disability" and
"qualified" through their selection of a substantially limited major life activity.
III. FELIX V. NEW YORK

CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY: EMPLOYERS NEED
ACCOMMODATE ONLY LIMITATIONS CAUSALLY CONNECTED TO PLAINTIFF'S
SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITED MAJOR LIFE ACTIvrrY

A.

DistrictandAppellate Court Opinions in Felix

Felix v. New York City TransitAuthority" is the primary case holding that the
scope ofthe duty of reasonable accommodation turns on the definition of disability.
The plaintiff in Felix worked as a railroad clerk for the New York City Transit
Authority. 7 As the plaintiff was on her way to relieve another clerk in a subway
token booth, she learned that the booth had been firebombed and that the other clerk
died in the attack.79 Following the incident, the plaintiff was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 0 Characteristics of her condition included sleep

74. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2000). Some courts have held that the duty of reasonable
accommodation requires employers to assign disabled employees to a vacant position even when more
qualified individuals also seek that position. See, e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154,
1169 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that "reasonable accommodation may require reassignment to a vacant
position" and that "requiring the reassigned employee to be the best qualified employee for the vacant
job, is ...unwarranted by the statutory language or its legislative history"); Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr.,
156 F.3d 1284, 1304-05 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that interpreting "the reassignment provision [in
the ADA] as mandating nothing more than that the employer allow the disabled employee to submit his
application along with all of the other candidates... would render the provision a nullity"). But see
EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that "the ADA does
not require an employer to reassign a disabled employee to ajob for which there is a better applicant,
provided it's the employer's consistent and honest policy to hire the best applicant for the particular
job in question rather than the first qualified applicant").
75. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 57, at 8; see also Cheryl L. Anderson, "Deserving
Disabilities": Why the Definition of Disability under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct Should Be
Revised to Eliminatethe SubstantialLimitationRequirement, 65 MO. L. REV.83, 144 (2000) (quoting
Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 57, at 8); Schwab & Willborn, supranote 57, at 1201 (quoting same);
Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as
Antidiscrimination,153 U. PA. L. REv. 579, 646 (2004) (quoting same).
76. See Issacharoff& Nelson, supra note 53, at 358 (referring to "the seemingly unfathomable
potential sweep of ADA claims").
77. 154 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), affd, 324 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2003).
78. Id. at 644.
79. Id. at 645.
80. Id. at 654.
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disturbance and an inability to work in the subway." Although most railroad clerks
worked in underground booths, approximately fifty clerks worked in above-ground
offices.82 The transit authority refused to reassign the plaintiff to an above-ground
office as an accommodation of her disability and ultimately discharged her due to
her inability to return to a subway position. 3
The Felix trial court found that the plaintiff had a disability within the meaning
of the ADA because her PTSD was an impairment that substantially limited her in
the major life activity of sleeping.84 The court also found that a reasonable jury
could conclude that the plaintiff was qualified for the position of an office-duty
railroad clerk because the ability to work in the subways on an as-needed basis may
not be an essential function of that position. 5 Finally, the court found that the
plaintiff's known inability to work in the subway placed the transit authority on6
notice as to the plaintiffs need for the office job reassignment accommodation.
Nonetheless, the district court found that the duty of reasonable accommodation
did not require the employer to reassign the plaintiff to an office job "because there
was no nexus or causal connection between Felix's ADA-qualifying limitation and
the reasonable accommodation sought."" The court reasoned that because the
plaintiffs substantially limited major life activity was sleeping, she was only
entitled to reasonable accommodation of her sleep difficulties, "such as permission
to come in late or to take naps during the day,"" Because the plaintiff did not allege
that her sleep difficulties affected her ability to work, the court found she was not
entitled to reasonable accommodation in the workplace. 9 According to the court,
accommodating limitations other than the limitation defining a plaintiff s disability
would broaden the effect of the ADA beyond equal opportunity and create a
preference for disabled persons, contrary to the statute's purpose.9"
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court.9 The appellate court first examined the language of the ADA
prohibiting "discrimination against an employee 'because of the disability of such
individual."' 92 Based on this language, the court reasoned that "an employer

81.
"terrified
2003).
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 645-46. The plaintiff explained that following the firebombing incident, she was
of being alone and closed in." Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir.
Felix, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 645.
Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Id. at 654.

85. Id. at 656. The court reasoned that "[g]iven how infrequently office duty Railroad Clerks are
actually required to work in the subways each year, and the number of subway duty Railroad Clerks
who could fulfill this function, ajury could find that Felix could have been transferred to an office duty
position without causing the NYCTA undue hardship." Id.
86. Id. at 657-58.
87. Id. at 660.
88. Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 640, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
89. Id. at 661-62. The court stated that "in deciding ADA employment cases, courts necessarily
look at a plaintiff's general ability to work." Id. at 661.
90. Id. at 662.
91. Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2003). The Second Circuit's
decision included both a concurring opinion and a dissenting opinion, but neither disagreed with the
holding that there must be a causal connection between the plaintiff's substantially limited major life
activity and the accomniodation sought. See id. at 108 (Jacobs, J., concurring); id. at 109 (Leval, J.,
dissenting) (expressing agreement "with the majority's perception of this requirement").
92. Id. at 104-05 (majority opinion) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000)).
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discriminates against an employee with a disability only by failing to provide a
reasonable accommodation for the 'disability' which is the impairment ofthe major
life activity.19 3 The plaintiffs disability, the court asserted, "was her insomnia
which substantially limited her ability to sleep," while her "inability to work in the
subway did not substantially limit any major life activity."' ' According to the court,
although the plaintiff s insomnia and her inability to work in the subway "stemmed
from the same traumatic incident and resultant psychological disorder, the
PTSD[,].... this common traumatic origin" did not mean that the plaintiff was
entitled to an accommodation for her inability to do subway work,9" just like an
individual who suffered several injuries in a single car accident can receive
accommodation only for the injury that left him or her unable to perform a major
life activity.
In the court's view, the plaintiff sought "a workplace accommodation for a
mental condition which does not flow directly from her disability-the mental
condition of insomnia that prevents her from sleeping."96 The court concluded that
only limitations caused by the plaintiff s disability-here, her insomnia-need be
accommodated., 97 Like the district court, the court of appeals reasoned that
requiring employers to accommodate other limitations of disabled employees would
provide them with a preference rather than equal opportunity: it "would transform
the ADA from an act that prohibits discrimination into an act that requires treating
people with disabilities better than others who are not disabled but have the same
impairment for which accommodation is sought." 9 Persons without disabilities who
are terrified to work underground are not entitled to any accommodation."9 Because
what entitled the plaintiff to accommodation under the ADA was
insomnia--something unconnected to her inability to work in the subway-her
request for non-subway work should be rejected just as a request made by an
individual with no disabilities would be rejected.
B. Flaws in the Reasoning of the Felix Courts
There are serious problems with the reasoning of both the Felix district court
and appellate court decisions. The district court suggested that disabled individuals
are entitled to reasonable accommodation only if they are substantially limited in
the major life activity of working."°° The text of the ADA, however, requires

93. Id. at 105.
94. Id.
95. Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2003). The court provided the
example of someone injured in a car accident who loses the ability to walk and also suffers some injury
to his arms which reduces his typing speed. Id. The court stated this individual would not be entitled
to accommodation for his arm injurybecause that injury does not substantially limit a major life activity
and is unrelated to his substantially limited major life activity of walking. Id.
96. Id. at 106.
97. Id. at 107.

98. Id.

99. Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 2003).
100. See Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 640, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that
"[p]laintiffs fail to recognize that in deciding ADA employment cases, courts necessarily look at a
plaintiff's general ability to work"); id. at 662 (noting that "the limitation that qualified [plaintiff] as
a disabled person did not affect her ability to work").
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employers to "mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability,"'' without any
indication that this duty applies only to individuals disabled in the maj or life activity
of working. Not only has the Supreme Court expressed doubt regarding the viability

of working as a major life activity," 2 the Court has flatly rejected the proposition
that "the question of whether an impairment constitutes a disability is to be
answered only by analyzing the effect of the impairment in the workplace."' 3 With
respect to the duty of reasonable accommodation, nothing suggests that the Court

would adopt a different view favoring the characterization of working as a major
life activity and defining disability in a workplace-specific manner.' Moreover, the
standard for being substantially limited in the major life activity of working is so
exacting that few disabled individuals will satisfy it,' yet nothing in the text or
legislative history of the ADA indicates that Congress intended the duty of
reasonable accommodation
to apply to only a narrow subsection of individuals with
10 6
disabilities.
The Felix district court also used questionable reasoning in distinguishing
Bragdon v. Abbott,"°7 in which the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff with
asymptomatic HIV was disabled under the ADA because the disease substantially
limited her in the major life activity of reproduction.'" The Felix district court
asserted that, "given its myriad of symptoms," HIV infection "is suigeneris."'' 9 The

101. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(5)(A) (2000).
102. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184,200 (2002); Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,492 (1999).
103. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 534 U.S. at 201. According to the Court, "the fact that the
Act's definition of 'disability' applies not only to" the statute's employment provisions, but also to its
provisions on public transportation and public accommodations "demonstrates that the definition is
intended to cover individuals with disabling impairments regardless ofwhether the individuals have any
connection to a workplace." Id. See also Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 508 (7th
Cir. 1998) (noting that a plaintiff's limitations need not "manifest specifically in the workplace before
the plaintiff may be accorded disabled status under the statute").
104. Working is disfavored as a major life activity, as evidenced by statements of both lower
courts and the EEOC that working should be considered "only when a complainant cannot show she
or he is substantially impaired in any other, more concrete major life activity." Mahon v. Craven
Crowell, 295 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Pryor v. Trane Co., 138 F.3d 1024, 1026-27 n. 15
(5th Cir. 1998) ("'If an individual is substantially limited in any other major life activity, no
determination should be made as to whether the individual is substantially limited in working."'
(quoting Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 726 n.10 (5th Cir. 1998))); EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, SECTION 902 DEFINITION OF THE TERM DIsABILITY

§ 902.4(c)

(2000) ("[T]he determination of whether a person's impairment is substantially limiting should first
address major life activities other than working."); id. § 902.4(c)(2) ("[O]ne need not determine
whether an impairment substantially limits an individual's ability to work if the impairment
substantially limits another major life activity.").
105. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. Individuals who do satisfy this difficult standard
risk falling outside the ADA's protected class because of the Catch-22 between "disability" and
"qualified." See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (2000) (stating Congress's finding that "individuals with
disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including . . . failure to make
modifications to existing facilities and practices"); 136 Cong. Rec. 17376 (1990) (providing Senator
Dole's statement that the ADA will offer "reasonable accommodations to empower persons with
disabilities to utilize their full potential in strengthening the work force").
107. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
108. Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 640, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641).
109. Id. at 661.
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court then quoted the Supreme Court's statement in Bragdon that "'HIV infection
must be regarded as a physiological disorder with a constant detrimental effect on
the infected person's hemic and lymphatic systems from the moment of
infection,"'. 0in support of the proposition that "[g]iven the panoply of symptoms,
it was not a big leap for the Court to decide that HIV infection is an ADA disability
for the purposes of Title rI." ' However, the Bragdon Court made the quoted
statement in the course of concluding that asymptomatic HIV was a "physical
impairment."'1' The Court never suggested that the numerous symptoms of HIV
meant that it did not need to identify a major life activity substantially affected by
the impairment. Instead, the Court emphasized that the ADA "is not operative, and
the definition [of disability] not satisfied, unless the impairment affects a major life
activity. ' The Court proceeded to hold that the plaintiff s HIV infection
substantially limited her in the major life activity of reproduction, and the ADA
therefore protected the plaintiff from disability discrimination.1 4 The Court did not
indicate that the plaintiff would receive protection from the discrimination alleged
in the case-the defendant dentist's refusal to treat her in his office-only if the
dentist discriminated against her based on the HIV's effect on her ability to
reproduce.1 5
Unlike the district court, the Second Circuit in Felix recognized that "a plaintiff
can seek accommodation at work even if the impairment only qualifies as a
disability because of a life activity other than working."'1 6 Nonetheless, the
appellate court decision also features questionable reasoning. The court repeatedly
referred to the plaintiffs disability as insomnia. 7 Certainly, if the plaintiffs
disability was insomnia, her inability to work in the subway would not be a
limitation caused by that disability, and the plaintiff would not be entitled to her
requested accommodation. Determining a plaintiff sdisability, however, must begin

110. Id. (quoting Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637).
111. Id.
112. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637 (following its observation about the "constant and detrimental
effect" of HIV infection with the conclusion that "HIV infection satisfies the statutory and regulatory
definition of a physical impairment during every stage of the disease") (emphasis added).
113. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,637 (1998). The Court noted, however, that "[g]iven the
pervasive, and invariably, fatal, course of the disease, its effect on major life activities of many sorts

might have been relevant to our inquiry." Id.The Court also expressed its confidence that "had different
parties brought the suit they would have maintained that an HIV infection imposes substantial

limitations on other major life activities." Id.
114. Id. at 639.
115. Id. at 648. Rather, the Court stated that "[n]otwithstanding the protection given [the
plaintiff] by the ADA's definition of disability, [the defendant] could have refused to treat her if her
infectious condition 'pose[d] a direct threat to the health or safety of others."' Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(b)(3) (2000)). The Court remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine whether the
plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the issue of direct threat. Id. at 655.
Despite the flaws in the district court's reasoning, however, Bragdonis arguably distinguishable
from Felix. Accordingly, Bragdon does not provide a definitive answer regarding the propriety of the
Felix limit on limitations. See infra note 201.
116. Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 2003).
117. Id. at 105 (stating that "her disability was her insomnia which substantially limited her
ability to sleep"); id. at 106 ("Felix seeks a workplace accommodation for a mental condition which
does not flow directly from her disability-the mental condition of insomnia that prevents her from

sleeping.").
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by identifying a physical or mental impairment."' The ADA defines disability as
"a physical or mental impairmentthat substantially limits one or more ... major
life
activities, ' .19 rather than as a limitation of a major life activity caused by a physical
or mental impairment. Insomnia that is not tied to any physical or mental condition
is unlikely to qualify as a physical or mental impairment. 2 °
The fact that insomnia is a short-hand term for a limitation on the major life
activity of sleeping eased the Second Circuit's task in defining the plaintiff's
disability as only the limitation on a major life activity,"' rather than, as the statue
indicates, the "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits... [a] major
life activit[y]." ' Accordingly, the court's characterization of plaintiff s disability
as insomnia rather than PTSD appears simple and accurate. The flaw in the court's
rhetoric would be more obvious if the case involved a different major life activity.
For example, it would seem awkward if, as in Bragdon, the plaintiff had the
physical impairment of HIV infection, which substantially limited her major life
activity of reproduction, and the court 2referred
to her disability as "reproductive
3
limitations" rather than HIV infection.
The Felix plaintiff did not claim-nor did the district court find-that her
insomnia constituted an impairment. Rather, the district court properly found that
her PTSD constituted a mental impairment, relying on a regulation defining "mental
impairment" as "any mental or psychological disorder, such as... emotional or
mental illness."' 24 Given that the plaintiff's impairment, and thus her disability, was
PTSD and not insomnia, does either the text of the ADA or precedent support the
Second Circuit's holding that the law only entitles the plaintiff to accommodation
for her sleeping difficulties? 2 '
Although the plaintiffs PTSD constituted a disability only because it
substantially limited her major life activity of sleeping, the ADA includes in its
definition of prohibited discrimination "not making reasonable accommodations to
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with

118. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631 (stating that in determining whether plaintiff had a disability,
"[f]irst, we consider whether [her] HIV infection was a physical impairment").
119. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
120. With the exception of Felix, cases consider insomnia an effect of a separate physical or
mental impairment and determine whether that impairment is a disability because it substantially limits
the major life activity of sleeping. See, e.g., Harris v. H&W Contracting Co., 102 F.3 d 516, 522 (11 th
Cir. 1996) (discussing plaintiff's insomnia as a symptom of Graves' disease); Guice-Mills v.
Derwinski, 967 F.2d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing plaintiffs insomnia as a symptom of
depression); Fink v. Printed Circuit Corp., 204 F. Supp. 2d 119, 122 (D. Mass. 2002) (discussing
plaintiffs insomnia as a symptom of Graves' disease). Other than the Felix court, courts have not
referred to insomnia as a disability.
121. Felix, 324 F.3d at 105.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
123. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631 ("We hold respondent's HIV infection was a disability under
subsection (A) of the definitional section of the statute."). Similarly, iftheplaintiff s mental impairment

was obsessive-compulsive disorder, which substantially limited her in the major life activity of caring
for herself, it would seem awkward for the court to refer to her disability as "limitations on caring for
self."

124. Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 640, 653-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2)).
125. Felix, 324 F.3d at 107 ("If the requested accommodation addressed a limitation caused by
Felix's insomnia, it would be covered by the ADA.... However, other impairments caused by the
disability need not be accommodated.").
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a disability." 2 ' Significantly, this statutory language delineating the duty of
reasonable accommodation does not state that, to be accommodated, limitations
must be causally connected to the plaintiff s substantially limited major life activity.
The statutory language indicates that Congress anticipated that more than one
limitation could flow from an individual's disability, arguably including limitations
unconnected to the substantially limited major life activity, and suggests that
Congress intended to require employers to accommodate all such limitations.' 27
Moreover, the other statutory provision tying reasonable accommodation to the
ADA's definition of disability discrimination prohibits employers from "denying
employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of [the
employer] to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental
impairments ofthe employee or applicant."' 28 This language reinforces the fact that
the duty of reasonable accommodation applies to an individual's impairment,
provided that the impairment satisfies the definition of disability, not to an
individual's substantially limited major life activity.
The Second Circuit claimed that the text of the ADA supported its
interpretation of the scope of the duty of reasonable accommodation by noting that
the duty is imposed as part of the prohibition of discrimination "'because of the
disability of such individual."" 29 According to the court, such discrimination occurs
only if the employer does not provide an accommodation for the individual's
substantially limited major life activity. 30 However, this understanding of disability
discrimination is unduly narrow. When an employer intentionally discriminates
against an individual with an actual disability because of that disability, courts do
not require the plaintiff to prove that the employer was motivated by--or even knew
about-the plaintiffs substantially limited major life activity.' 3' Similarly, a
plaintiff with an actual disability claiming discrimination in the form of failure to
provide reasonable accommodation should not face restrictions based on the
126. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
127. This is the position taken by the EEOC. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
supranote 6, at 39 ("Reasonable accommodation extends to all limitations resulting from a disability,"
including the side effects of medication or treatment and "any symptoms or related medical conditions
resulting from the disability that cause limitations."); Brief of Amicus Curiae EEOC in Support of
Plaintiffs in Favor of Reversal at 9, Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2003) (No.
01-7967), 2001 WL 34377950 (contending that "the employer must accommodate any known workrelated limitations, notjust substantial limitations ofa major life activity, resulting from the individual's
disability").
128. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
129. Felix, 324 F.3d at 104-05 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)).
130. Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2003).
131. Assume that the plaintiff has the mental impairment of depression, and that the impairment
constitutes a disability because it substantially limits her major life activity of sleeping. Provided that
the plaintiff is a qualified individual, the plaintiff only needs to prove that her employer took an adverse
employment action against her because of her depression to establish intentional disability
discrimination. She does not need to prove that her sleeping difficulties caused the employer's action.
An employer's belief about the impairment's effect on the plaintiffs major life activities is relevant
only if the plaintiff is attempting to prove that the employer regarded the plaintiff as disabled. See
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) (stating that a plaintiff satisfies the
"regarded as" definition of disability where "(1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that [the plaintiff]
has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered
entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more maj or
life activities.").
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plaintiff's substantially limited major life activity. At the very least, the fact that the
violation of the duty of reasonable accommodation is a form of disability
discrimination does not compel such restrictions.'
Not only did the Second Circuit strain the language of the ADA, the court also
used tenuous reasoning to distinguish other cases, 3 including the Ninth Circuit's
decision in McAlindin v. County of San Diego.'34 The plaintiff in McAlindin
suffered from "anxiety disorders, panic disorders, and somatoform disorders" and
the court held that those disorders may have substantially limited him in the major

life activities of "sleeping, engaging in sexual relations, and interacting with

others."' 35 The court also concluded that the plaintiff's employer may have violated
its duty of reasonable accommodation by "fail[ing] to transfer [the plaintiff] to
another job, fail[ing] to give him necessary training, and disciplin[ing] him for
sleeping that was caused by his medications."' 36 InFelix,the Second Circuit stated
that "McAlindin differs from Felix's situation because McAlindin appeared to be
seeking accommodation for the same mental impairments, such as the inability to
interact with other people, as constituted his claimed disability."' 37 However, the
McAlindin plaintiff asserted that he was substantially limited in the major life
activity of engaging in sexual relations, yet none of his requested accommodations

132. The Second Circuit relied on this unduly narrow understanding of disability discrimination
to distinguish Bragdon.See Felix, 324 F.3d at 106-07. Despite the lack of evidence that the plaintiff s
limited ability to engage in reproduction influenced the defendant dentist in Bragdon, the Felix court
stated that the discrimination was because of her disability because "the same specific medical
condition-the risk of HIV transmission-was responsible for both the impairment of her reproductive
capacity and the dentist's unreasonable failure to accommodate her." Id. at 106. Other than in its
discussion of the "direct threat" defense, however, the Supreme Court's opinion in Bragdon indicates
no concern with what effect of the plaintiff's HIV infection may have motivated the dentist to refuse
to treat her. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 648-55 (1998). Nothing in the opinion suggests that
the dentist would not have discriminated against the plaintiff because of her disability if he refused to
treat her for a reason other than the risk of HIV transmission-such as a belief that persons infected
with HIV are mentally unstable or financially unreliable.
133. The court failed to adequately distinguish its earlier decision in Lovejoy- Wilson v. NOCO
MotorFuel,Inc., 263 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2001). In Lovejoy- Wilson, the court permitted the reasonable
accommodation claim of a plaintiff with epilepsy to survive summary judgment, where she requested
permission to make bank deposits using a means other than driving, even though driving is not
considered a major life activity. Id. at 217. If driving is not a major life activity, the Lovejoy-Wilson
plaintiff should not have been entitled to that accommodation. However, the Second Circuit in Felix
attempted to distinguish Lovejoy- Wilson by stating that "Lovejoy-Wilson's inability to drive is due to
the same disability-periodic and sudden loss of all motor control-that qualifies her as disabled
because it substantially impairs a major life activity." Felix, 324 F.3d at 106. The Felix court admitted
in a footnote that the Lovejoy- Wilson court failed to identify any major life activity substantially limited
by the plaintiffs epilepsy. Id. at 106 n. 1 (citing Lovejoy- Wilson, 263 F.3d at 216). The Lovejoy- Wilson
court concluded that the plaintiff was disabled by noting that the defendant employer "does not dispute
that the plaintiff suffers from epilepsy or that epilepsy constitutes a disability under the ADA, a
proposition that is well established." Lovejoy- Wilson, 263 F.3d at 216. Yet if the Lovejoy- Wilson court
did not identify a major life activity substantially limited by the plaintiffs epilepsy, but nonetheless
held that the plaintiff was entitled to reasonable accommodation, the scope of the duty of reasonable
accommodation cannot be coextensive with the substantially limited major life activity. Otherwise a
court could never consider a plaintiff's reasonable accommodation claim without identifying the major
life activity upon which the plaintiff based the claim of disability status.
134. 192 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1999), amended by 201 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2000).
135. Id. at 1230.
136. Id. at 1236, 1238. The plaintiff sought a transfer because "several of his doctors had advised
that he not return to his previous work setting because the negative associations there would impede
his recovery." Id. at 1231.
137. Felix, 324 F.3d at 106.
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were causally connected to that activity.1 38 Moreover, the McAlindin court expressly
rejected the proposition that disabled individuals are entitled to accommodation
only for limitations causally connected to their substantially limited major life
activity:
[O]nce McAlindin is viewed as disabled, the major life activities
affected by the impairment are relevant only to the extent that they
affect the type of accommodation that may be necessary and
whether the employer has provided a reasonable
accommodation....

Thus, the sleep disorder and the sexual

dysfunction merely help to establish that the impairment (panic
disorder after treatment) affects a major life activity; they are not
relevant to the reasonable accommodation discussion, however,
which focuses on the post-treatment panic disorder's
manifestations in the workplace and the employer's response to
them. 139
Perhaps the most illuminating aspect of the Second Circuit's opinion in Felix
is the court's attempt to distinguish Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Department of
Administration.140 In Vande Zande the Seventh Circuit held that the duty to
accommodate a partially paralyzed woman, who was substantially limited in the
major life activity of walking, extended to pressure ulcers that she developed due
to her paralysis. 4 ' The Felix court acknowledged that the pressure ulcers did not
relate directly to walking but, quoting Vande Zande, stated "the ulcers were 'a
characteristic manifestation of [the] disability' and thus were 'a part of the
underlying disability."' 142 Thus, the Felix court easily accepted that the physical
impairment of paralysis may cause pressure ulcers and that the duty of reasonable
accommodation requires employers to accommodate a paralyzed employee's
pressure ulcers. Later in the Second Circuit's opinion, the court engaged in the same
type ofreasoning with respect to the physical impairment of AIDS, stating that "[i]n
cases involving conditions like AIDS that are discrete diseases with pervasive
effects, it will
frequently be obvious that the lesser impairment is caused by the
143
disability.'
The Felix court's approach was different, however, for mental impairments like
PTSD. The court stated, "We do not view her insomnia and fear of the subway as
a singular mental condition: They are two mental conditions that derive from the
same traumatic incident."' 44 According to the court, "[I]n situations like plaintiff's

138. McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1230, 1236-38.
139. Id. at 1237 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998)) (describing the opinion in
Bragdon v. Abbott as "discussing the ability to reproduce as the major life activity at issue with respect
to HIV even though the discrimination involved refusal to provide medical care that was in no way
connected to reproduction").
140. Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (distinguishing Vande
Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543-44 (7th Cir. 1995)).
141. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544.
142. Felix, 324 F.3d at 106 (quoting Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544).
143. Id. at 107.
144. Id.
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where it is not clear that a single, particular medical condition is responsible for
both the disability and the lesser impairment, the plaintiff must show a causal
connection between the specific condition which impairs a major life activity and
the accommodation."'"
Why was the Felix court uncertain that a single medical condition was
responsible for both the plaintiff's sleeping problems and her inability to work in
the subway? The court was correct that one would not automatically view an
inability to work in the subway as a "characteristic manifestation" of PTSD in the
same way that pressure ulcers may be a "characteristic manifestation" of
paralysis. 46 However, the Diagnosticand StatisticalManual ofMental Disorders
(DSM-IV) provides that "[t]he essential feature of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder is
the development of characteristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme
traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of an event that involves
actual or threatened death or serious injury, or other threat to one's physical
integrity."147 The DSM-IV includes "persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with
the trauma" as one of the "characteristic symptoms resulting from the exposure to
the extreme trauma."' 48 A person exhibiting this symptom "commonly makes

deliberate efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations about the traumatic
event.., and to avoid activities, situations, or people who arouse recollections.', 49
Another characteristic symptom of PTSD is "[i]ntense psychological distress.., or
physiological reactivity... occur[ing] when the person is exposed to triggering
events that resemble or symbolize an aspect of the traumatic event." 50 This
description of PTSD reveals why a person would experience an extreme fear of
returning to the subway if she developed PTSD after narrowly avoiding death by
firebomb in the subway in an incident that killed another worker. 5'
If the Felix court was uncertain that the plaintiffs PTSD caused both her
sleeping problems and her inability to work in the subway,' the court should have
responded by requiring medical evidence of such a causal connection, just as a court
presumably would require of a plaintiff with any other physical or mental
impairment. Moreover, the court's standard of review should be whether a
reasonable jury could find such a causal connection. A court should not require the
plaintiff to demonstrate a causal connection not only between her impairment and

145. Id.
146. Id. at 106 (quoting Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544).
147. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
424 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. Other extreme traumatic stressors, exposure to which might
trigger PTSD, include "witnessing an event that involves death, injury, or a threat to the physical
integrity of another person; or learning about unexpected or violent death, serious harm, or threat of
death or injury experienced by a family member or other close associate." Id.
148. Id. at 424-25.
149. Id.
150. Id. The DSM-IV provides the example of"entering any elevator for a woman who was raped
in an elevator." Id. at 424.
151. The DSM-IV description of PTSD demonstrates that the plaintiff's insomnia was also a
predictable consequence of the impairment. DSM-IV, supranote 147, at 425 (stating that an individual
with PTSD "has persistent symptoms of anxiety or increased arousal that were not present before the
trauma," which "may include difficulty falling or staying asleep").
152. Interestingly, the district court in Felix recognized that the plaintiff's impairment "was
PTSD which limited her ability to sleep and also prevented her from working in the subways." Felix
v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 640, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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the limitation she wants accommodated, but also between her substantially limited
major life activity and the requested accommodation.
The court's reasoning and distinguishment of PTSD from paralysis and AIDS
suggest a suspicion about mental impairments as disabilities which merit the full
protection of the ADA.15 3 The court was forced to conclude that the plaintiff had a
disability because PTSD was clearly a mental impairment and medical reports
indicated that the plaintiff was "only sleeping one or two hours per night."15 4
However, the court restricted the plaintiff's ability to access the protections of the
ADA by greatly limiting the scope of the duty of reasonable accommodation. 5
Under the Felix court's holding, with the exception of limitations directly related
to her insomnia, the plaintiff was protected from discrimination because of her
PTSD only to the extent that she could prove disparate treatment. 5 6 If her PTSD
renders her different from other employees in ways other than insomnia, such that
equal treatment of the plaintiff is not enough to provide equal opportunity in the
workplace, she would have no recourse under the ADA.
C. JudicialResponses to Felix
Despite the demonstrable weaknesses in the Felix opinions, only one post-Felix
case has expressly rejected their holding that employers must accommodate only
limitations causally connected to a disabled individual's substantially limited major
life activity.' 57 The plaintiff in Arnold v. County ofCook"58
' was a county probation
department officer who had back and neck conditions that substantially limited him

153. Suspicion of PTSD as an impairment worthy of ADA protection is particularly apparent in
the concurring opinion. Judge Jacobs reasoned as follows:
The dissent puts store in the medical diagnosis that this plaintiff's insomnia
is a product of post-traumatic stress disorder. That syndrome is real enough, but
it is (as the phrase denotes) a diagnostic grouping in each case of whatever
nervous manifestations a particular person suffers in the wake of stress. One
person may react to stress by insomnia, another by sleeping overmuch; one person
is manic, another is enervated; one overeats, another fasts; one cannot go out in
public, another needs a crowd. The diagnosis does not predict the symptom of
insomnia, does not suggest its severity or treatment, and therefore cannot be used
by an employer to differentiate the disabled from persons who are merely
impaired or uncomfortable.
Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 109 n.1 (2d Cir. 2003) (Jacobs, J., concurring)
(citations omitted). In fact, the DSM-IV lists insomnia as a common consequence of PTSD. See supra
note 15 1. Moreover, employers may be unfamiliar with the symptoms of many impairments. In such
a case, they will need to rely on information from an employee's doctor to know if the impairment is
serious enough to constitute a disability and what limitations flow from that impairment. PTSD is not
unusual in this regard.
154. Felix, 324 F.3d at 109 n.1 (Leval, J., dissenting).
155. See id. at 107 ("However, other impairments not caused by the disability need not be
accommodated.").
156. Along with requiring reasonable accommodation, the ADA also prohibits disparate treatment
on the basis of disability. Peebles v. Potter, 354 F.3d 761, 765 (8th Cir. 2004). Disparate treatment
occurs when an employer treats a person differently from others because of a protected trait such as a
disability. Id. at 765.
157. As discussed suprain notes 133-44 and accompanying text, McAlindin and Vande Zande
also conflict with the Felix holding, but those cases were decided prior to Felix.
158. 220 F. Supp. 2d 893 (N.D. Ill.
2002).
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in the major life activities of pushing and pulling. 59 Because his conditions also
made long-distance driving painful, the plaintiff sought as a reasonable
accommodation a reduction in the amount of driving associated with his job. 60 His

employer asserted that driving was not a major life activity 6' and, relying on Felix,
contended that "a reasonable accommodation claim fails unless the
' 62 requested
accommodation is directed toward a major life activity impairment."'
According to the Arnold court, the Felix holding conflicts with the text of the
ADA, because the statutory provision requiring "reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability" 63 "includes nothing to suggest that it applies only to 'substantial'
limitations or limitations that impact 'major life activities.""' The court also
proposed the following hypothetical:
Suppose an office worker has severe allergies to a wide range of
organic substances. As a result, the worker's ability to care for
herself, which is a major life activity under applicable regulations,
is substantially impaired in multitudinous ways. One relatively
minor effect of her allergies is that she cannot touch rubber bands.
Her employer refuses to allow her to substitute metal binder-clips
for rubber bands, even though
they are equally effective and the
65
cost difference is slight.
Using rubber bands is certainly not a major life activity, 6 ' nor does it relate directly
to the major life activity of caring for oneself. However, the court stated, "it is partly
because the rubber band limitation is minor that not accommodating it is
unreasonable.' 67 Moreover, the court was not concerned that requiring
accommodation of all limitations caused by a disabling impairment would result in
an unfair preference for individuals with disabilities, reasoning that "[e]very
accommodation is in some sense a preference.' 6 Rather, the court concluded that
the ADA's purpose of eliminating "discrimination 'because of disability ....

is

served directly by requiring employers to accommodate
the limitations of employees
69
where those limitations derive from a disability.'

159. Id. at 895. The plaintiff also alleged that he was substantially limited in the major life
activities of standing, sitting, bending, lifting, carrying, and walking. Id. The court did not address
whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of substantial limitation in those areas. Id.

160. Id.
161. Id. at 895. The court did "note that there are compelling reasons to think that driving should
qualify as a major life activity." Id. at 895 n.3. But see Chenoweth v. Hillsborough County, 250 F.3d
1328, 1329-30 (1 th Cir. 2001) (distinguishing driving from established major life activities); Colwell
v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 643 (2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting driving as a major life
activity).
162. Arnold v. County of Cook, 220 F. Supp. 2d 893, 895-96 (N.D. Ill. 2002).

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
Arnold, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 896.
Id.
Id.
Id.

168. Id. Given that "the ADA clearly requires accommodation in some circumstances," the court
stated that "[t]he question is not whether, but when." Id.
169. Arnold v. County of Cook, 220 F. Supp. 2d 893, 897 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
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In contrast to Arnold, the single case expressly rejecting Felix, a few opinions
appear at first glance to follow the Felix limit on the limitations an employer must
accommodate. Two cases, Coleman-Adebayo v. Leavitt 70 and Liljedahl v. Ryder
Student TransportationServices, Inc.,I71 involved plaintiffs with multiple physical
impairments, at least one of which might have constituted a disability and triggered
the duty of reasonable accommodation. However, the accommodations the plaintiffs
sought related only to their nondisabling impairments. 172 Although the courts in
both cases rejected the plaintiffs' accommodation claims by relying on the Felix
limit on limitations, 73 these cases are unlike Felix because neither involved a
request for an accommodation of a limitation that was caused by the plaintiffs
disabling impairment. Rather, these cases stand for the uncontroversial proposition
that employers are not required to accommodate
any limitations other than those
74
caused by the plaintiff's disability. 1
Peebles v. Potter,75 another case purporting to rely on the Felix limit on
limitations, is also distinguishable. The plaintiff in Peebles suffered groin and back

170. 326 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.D.C. 2004).
171. 341 F.3d 836 (8th Cir. 2003).
172. The plaintiffin Coleman-Adebayosuffered from multiple sclerosis, glaucoma, optic neuritis,
and high blood pressure, and she claimed that these impairments substantially limited her in the major
life activities of breathing, walking, and seeing. Coleman-Adebayo,326 F. Supp. 2d at 141. She sought
permission to work from home as a reasonable accommodation but only supported that request by her
cardiologist's opinion that her blood pressure could be better controlled if she worked at home. Id.
While plaintiff's multiple sclerosis, glaucoma, and optic neuritis may have qualified as disabling
impairments, her inability to work at the office was not a limitation caused by those impairments. Id.
at 143. The reason she requested the accommodation-her high blood pressure-did not substantially
limit any of her major life activities and thus it was not a disability under the ADA. Id. at 142.
The plaintiff in Liljedahl had emphysema and was later diagnosed with lung cancer. Liljedahl,
341 F.3d at 838. The court concluded that because her "cancer surgery was successful and her
recuperation period was limited," the plaintiff's cancer did not substantially limit any of her major life
activities. Id. at 841. While the plaintiff's emphysema may have substantially limited her major life
activity of breathing, the only accommodation she sought was a modified work schedule to allow her
to have surgery for her cancer and to recuperate from that surgery. Id. at 842-43. The court noted that
"[n]othing suggests [the plaintiff s] emphysema or breathing problems required an accommodation."
Id. at 842.
173. See Liljedahl, 341 F.3d at 842-43 (discussing the Felix limit on limitations as addressed in
Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 339 F.3d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 2003)); Coleman-Adebayo, 326 F. Supp.
2d at 143-44. See the discussion of Wood infra notes 183-95 and accompanying text.
174. Although unlike Felix, these cases are like Buckley v. ConsolidatedEdison Co., 155 F.3d
150 (2d Cir. 1998) (en banc). The Buckley court assumed that the plaintiff fell into the ADA's
protected class because he was a former substance abuser. See id. at 154-56; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12114 (b)(1) (2000) (providing that an individual who "has successfully completed a supervised drug
rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs" may be a qualified
individual with a disability). The plaintiffs employer required him to undergo regular urine testing for
drugs and fired him when he was unable to provide a timely urine sample because of a neurogenic
bladder condition. Id. at 151. The plaintiff claimed that his employer should have reasonably
accommodated his bladder condition by providing him more time to urinate. Id. at 156. The plaintiff's
bladder condition did not substantially limit any major life activities and did not result from the
plaintiff's former substance abuse. Id. at 154, 156. Accordingly, the court rejected the plaintiffs
reasonable accommodation claim because the only condition the employer failed to accommodate-the
plaintiff's neurogenic bladder condition-"neither is nor resultsfrom the only impairment here alleged
to be a disability with the meaning of the ADA." Id. at 157 (emphasis added). Although the above
language suggests that employers must accommodate all limitations resulting from disabilities, and not
only those implicating a major life activity, the Second Circuit in Felix never mentioned its earlier
decision in Buckley.
175. 354 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 2004).
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injuries while working as a letter carrier. 76 The postal service was unable to provide
him with work that satisfied his physician-imposed work restrictions, and he did not
work for a two-year period.' 77 He then obtained a different physician who imposed
less-restrictive work prohibitions. 7 1 When the plaintiff attempted to return to work,
his supervisor informed him that he could not return until he provided
documentation substantiating that his physician-imposed work restrictions
continued throughout his absence. 179 The plaintiff never provided the
documentation and his employer never allowed him to return to work, ultimately
terminating him due to his long absence from the workplace." 0
The Peebles court rejected the plaintiff s accommodation claim, citing the Felix
limit on limitations in support of its conclusion that the ADA does not require
employers "to level the playing field beyond those undulations that are related to the
person's disability."'' Unlike in Felix, however, the accommodation sought by the
plaintiff in Peebles-waiver of his employer's substantiation rule-was not
necessary due to any limitation caused by his disabling impairment. Even though
he would not have missed work and would not need to comply with the
substantiation rule if he were not disabled, his back and groin injuries made it no
more difficult for him to comply with that rule. Because Peebles did not involve a
disability-related limitation, agreement with the result in Peebles does not mean that
the Felix court was correct in its holding that employers need to accommodate only
those disability-related limitations causally connected to a substantially limited
major life activity.
Only one judicial decision has relied on Felix to reject a plaintiff's claim for an
accommodation of a limitation related to his disability because the limitation was
not causally connected to the plaintiff s substantially limited major life activity.I8 2
The plaintiff in Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc."3 was a ready-mix concrete truck

176. Id. at 764. It was undisputed that the plaintiffwas disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
Id. at 765.
177. Id.

178. Id. at 764.
179. Id.
180. Peebles v. Potter, 354 F.3d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 2004).

181. Id. at 769. Like Liljedahl,Peebles discusses the Felix limit on limitations by citing Wood
v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 339 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2003). Peebles, 354 F.3d at 769. Thus, Peeblesrelies
on a case citing Felix, rather than Felix itself. See the discussion of Wood infra notes 183-95 and
accompanying text.
182. A somewhat similar case is Nuzum v. Ozark Automotive Distributors,Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d
852 (S.D. Iowa 2004). The plaintiff in Nuzum developed tendinitis, which rendered him unable to
perform the lifting requirements of his job as an order picker. Id. at 856-57. As a reasonable
accommodation, the plaintiff sought another position that fell within his lifting restrictions. Id. at
857-58. The court concluded that the plaintiffwas not substantially limited in the major life activities
of lifting, working, or sleeping and thus did not have a disability under the ADA. Id. at 870. The court
also stated in dicta:
Even assuming Nuzum was substantially limited in the major life activity of
sleeping (or driving, hugging his wife, doing outside chores, etc., if considered
major life activities), Ozark does not have a duty to accommodate such a
limitation ....Nuzum did not request any accommodations related to his alleged
difficulty sleeping; rather the accommodations sought were related to his lifting
restriction. Thus, there is no causal connection between the accommodation
sought and the activity limited.
Id. at 867 n.ll.
183. 339 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2003).
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driver who suffered a back injury at work, which limited his ability to perform some
daily activities and rendered him unable to perform the requirements of his job.'84
He sought transfer to a non-ready-mix truck job as a reasonable accommodation.'85
The court concluded that although the plaintiff s injury caused moderate limitations
and work, he was not substantially
on his ability to walk, stand, turn, bend, lift,
86
limited in any of these major life activities.
The plaintiff in Wood also alleged that his injury rendered him completely
unable to procreate, but the court concluded that disability status based on the major
life activity of procreation did not entitle him to any reasonable accommodation' 7
Relying on Felix, the court stated that "there must be a causal connection between
the major life activity that is limited and the accommodation sought."'8 8
Like the reasoning in both Felix opinions, some of the reasoning in Wood is
questionable. The Wood court quoted the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the ADA's
reasonable accommodation provision8 9 in Taylor v. PrincipalFinancialGroup,
Inc., 9" as meaning "that 'the ADA requires employers to reasonably accommodate
limitations, not disabilities.'"""' The Fifth Circuit, however, never suggested that
employers need accommodate only limitations causally connected to a substantially
limited major life activity. Rather, Taylor involved the notice component of the duty
of reasonable accommodation, and the court held that communication of an
employee's disability status does not place the employer on notice of the
employee's disability-related limitations and resulting need for accommodation. 92
Accordingly, Taylor does not support the Felix limit on limitations.
However, some of the Wood court's reasoning is more persuasive. The Wood
court suggested that the requested accommodation might constitute preferential
treatment for the plaintiff, rather than merely creating a level playing field. The
court noted that the plaintiff "requested a non-ready-mix truck job not because of
his inability to procreate, but because of limitations in his ability to lift, bend, stand,
and walk."' 9 3 If the plaintiff had all of those limitations but was still able to
procreate, he would have no ADA-qualifying disability and would be entitled to no
accommodation. "' The court concluded that "[i]t would be a strange result, and one
we do not believe Congress intended, to have the viability of Wood's claim that he

184. Id. at 684. The plaintiff's physician "prohibited him from driving a ready-mix truck, from
lifting in excess of fifty pounds, and from performing extensive bending, twisting, and lifting." Id.
185. Id.
at 687.
186. Id. at 685-86. With regard to the activity of working, the court noted that "(the evidence
shows that Wood's injuries prevent him from driving only a ready-mix concrete truck and that he is able
to drive other trucks." Id. at 686.
187. Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 339 F.3d 682, 686-87 (8th Cir. 2003).
188. Id. at 687.
189. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (requiring employers to provide "reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with

a disability").

190. 93 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 1996).
191. Wood, 339 F.3d at 687 (quoting Taylor, 93 F.3d at 164).
192. Taylor, 93 F.3d at 164 ("[I]t is important to distinguish between an employer's knowledge
of an employee's disability versus an employer's knowledge of any limitations experienced by the
employee as a result of that disability."). The Taylor court r'oted that the plaintiff told his supervisor

only that he was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and did not mention any limitations caused by his
impairment. Id.
193. Wood, 339 F.3d at 687.
194. Id.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol57/iss2/4
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should have been accommodated as an employee of a truck-driving company turn
solely on whether or not he was impotent."' 5
Prior to Felix and Wood, other courts expressed doubt that disability status
based on the major life activity of reproduction entitled a plaintiff to reasonable
accommodation in the workplace.' 96 For example, in Quick v. Tripp, Scott, Conklin
& Smith, P.A. ,197the court acknowledged that the Bragdon decision required the
finding that the plaintiffs Hepatitis C was a disability because it substantially
limited the major life activity of reproduction.'98 The court commented, however,
"Bragdon does not identify how an employer, or any other covered entity, can
reasonably accommodate an ADA plaintiffwhose asserted impairment substantially
limits the reproductive system."' 99 Thus, the Quick court defined the duty of
reasonable accommodation much like the Felix court, as covering only limitations
connected to a plaintiff's substantially limited major life activity. 00
The language of the ADA does not compel the Felix rule, nor does the
precedent relied upon by the Felix or Wood courts. The preferential treatment
argument is harder to refute, however, as is the apparent incongruity of mandating
accommodation in the workplace of a person disabled with respect to the major life

195. Id.
196. For example, the plaintiff inChenoweth v. Hillsborough County, who had epilepsy which
affected her ability to drive, asked her employer to permit her to work from home on some days and
vary her schedule at the office to accommodate her transportation needs. Chenoweth, 250 F.3d 1328,
1329 (11th Cir. 2001). The court rejected her claim, holding that she did not have a disability: driving
was not a major life activity, and the plaintiff's condition did not substantially limit her ability to work.
Id. at 1329-30. The court also noted the plaintiffs reference "to the effect of epilepsy on her
reproductive capacity" but concluded that "the increase in risk in this regard had no relevance at all to
her work for the County or to her request to the County for accommodation." Id. at 1330.
Similarly, the plaintiff in Rook v. Xerox Corp.had cancer that resulted in a partial hysterectomy,
leaving her unable to bear any more children. See Rook v. Xerox Corp., No. 02-20109, 2002 WL
31933126 at *1(5th Cir. Dec. 18, 2002); Brief of Amicus Curiae EEOC in Support of Plaintiff and in
Favor of Reversal at 3, Rook v. Xerox Corp., No. 02-20109, 2002 WL 1933126 (5th Cir. Dec. 18,
2002) [hereinafter EEOC Brief]. The plaintiff s cancer recurred after she began working for defendant
Xerox, and she alleged that Xerox denied her reasonable accommodation by firing her when she was
on leave for treatment of her cancer. EEOC Brief at 7, 14. The district court granted Xerox summary
judgment on the plaintiff's ADA claim without opinion, but during the summaryjudgment hearing, the
court questioned plaintiffs counsel about the relation between the plaintiff's leave request and her
inability to bear children. See id. at 7-8. According to the court, the only way that the plaintiff-who
was disabled in the major life activity of reproduction-would be entitled to leave as a reasonable
accommodation would be if she went "to the Philippines to adopt a child." See id. at 8. The Fifth
Circuit, however, affirmed the grant of summary judgment on other grounds, without considering
whether the ADA required a "nexus between [the plaintiffs] physical limitation and the reasonable
accommodation she sought." Rook, 2002 WL 31933126 at *4-5.
197. 43 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
198. Id. at 1367-68. Hepatitis C is an incurable disease that an infected mother can transmit to
a fetus, and the plaintiff testified that having the virus caused her to forego having more children. Id.
at 1360-61, 1367.
199. Id. at 1368 n.7. The court noted further that it could not "find any accommodation that could
suffice to increase reproductive capabilities, especially in the employment context." Id.
In my General Employment Law course, students have expressed similar incredulity that a
plaintiff disabled pursuant to the major life activity of reproduction could assert a viable reasonable
accommodation claim for anything other than leave to adopt a child or obtain infertility treatment.
200. Id.
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activity of reproduction.2"' In light of these concerns, is the Felixlimit on limitations
an appropriate interpretation of the scope of the duty of reasonable accommodation?
IV. PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT AND THE FELixRuLE: WOULD ACCOMMODATION
OF ALL LIMITATIONS FLOWING FROM A DISABILrrY CONSTITUTE AN UNFAIR
ADVANTAGE FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DIsABILrrIEs?

Since the ADA's inception, courts have stated that the statute's requirement of
reasonable accommodation should be understood as leveling the playing field for

individuals with disabilities rather than providing them preferential treatment.2 2 It
is most apparent that the duty of reasonable accommodation does not result in an
unfair advantage for disabled individuals when the accommodation sought is
causally connected to their substantially limited major life activity. For example, an
individual with diabetes may be substantially limited in the major life activity of
eating.20 3 If the individual receives an exception from a neutral work rule allowing

employees to eat only during designated meal breaks, that accommodation does not

unfairly benefit the individual compared to other employees. 2" While some of the

disabled individual's coworkers might like the ability to snack during the
workday-and might even perform their jobs better if their employer permitted
them to do so--these coworkers are not similarly situated to the individual with
diabetes in this regard. The work rule regarding eating does not pose a similar
barrier to their ability to succeed in the workplace.
However, if the individual with diabetes receives an accommodation unrelated
to the major life activity of eating, the preferential treatment argument becomes
stronger. During periods of low blood sugar, individuals with diabetes may
experience disorientation, memory loss, difficulty concentrating, difficulty standing,
irritability, and mood swings.2 5 An individual with diabetes may request as a
reasonable accommodation a brief "cooling off' period when agitated because of
low blood sugar, even though this agitation does not render the individual

substantially limited in the major life activity ofinteracting with others. Some of the

201. The Supreme Court's decision in Bragdon, recognizing reproduction as a major life activity,
does not resolve the Felix issue because Bragdon only involved a prohibition of intentional
discrimination because of disability. Bradgon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 629, 639 (1998). Reasonable

accommodation places a greater burden on employers than does a mere prohibition of disparate
treatment, and one could argue that the greater burden is justifiable only where the limitation an
employee wants accommodated directly relates to the substantially limited major life activity. See
supra note 54.
202. See, e.g., Malabarba v. Chicago Tribune Co., 149 F.3d 690, 700 (7th Cir. 1998) ("While

Congress enacted the ADA to establish a 'level playing field' for our nation's disabled workers,..

. it

did not do so in the name of discriminating against persons free from disability.") (citing Schmidt v.
Methodist Hosp., 89 F.3d 342, 344 (7th Cir. 1996)); Terrell v. USAir, 132 F.3d 621, 627 (11 th Cir.
1998) ("We cannot accept that Congress, in enacting the ADA, intended to grant preferential treatment

for disabled workers.").
203. See Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1041 (9th Cir. 2003).

204. Analogous examples include an individual who is substantially limited in sleeping and
receives a later start to his or her work day as a reasonable accommodation; an individual who is
substantially limited in seeing and receives the assistance of a reader as a reasonable accommodation;
or an individual who is substantially limited in walking and receives specialized furniture for his or her
wheelchair as a reasonable accommodation.
205. See Siefken v. Vill. ofArlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 665-66 (7th Cir. 1995); Bugg-Barber
v. Randstad US, L.P., 271 F. Supp. 2d 120, 122-23 (D.D.C. 2003).
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individual's coworkers may have difficulty controlling their anger and would also
benefit from this adjustment of work rules. In fact, some coworkers may experience
bouts of irritability or anger due to their own physical or mental impairments which
do not rise to the level of disabilities. °6 In contrast to the eating accommodation, the
individual with diabetes is arguably similarly situated to other workers with respect
to this "cooling off' accommodation. The accommodation would assist both the
disabled employee and other workers by addressing an impairment-related
limitation that does not constitute a substantial limitation of a major life activity.
Does accommodating only the disabled individual's bouts of irritability constitute
an unfair advantage rather than a level playing field?
A similar issue arises when individuals without actual disabilities fall into the
ADA's protected class only because an employer regards them as having a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. 207 These
individuals often have impairments that limit their ability to perform various
workplace tasks, even though they are not limiting enough to constitute actual
disabilities; accordingly, these individuals often would benefit from a reasonable
accommodation. 20 ' By defining "disability" as including those "regarded as"
disabled 0 9 and including the concept of reasonable accommodation in the definition
of "qualified individual with a disability,"2 '0 the ADA indicates that individuals who
are regarded as disabledare entitled to reasonable accommodation.2 11

206. For example, bipolar disorder and PTSD may include irritability and outbursts of anger as
characteristic symptoms. DSM-IV, supra note 147, at 328-29, 425. Courts have rejected the ADA
claims of some plaintiffs with bipolar disorder or PTSD, finding that they failed to establish that these
mental impairments substantially limited one of their major life activities. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 183, 189 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that PTSD did not substantially
limit the plaintiff in caring for herself); Kramer v. Hickey-Freeman, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that bipolar disorder did not substantially limit the plaintiff's ability to work).
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(c) (2000).
208. See, e.g., Kelly v. Metallics West, Inc., 410 F.3d 670,676 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that an
employer must permit an employee with a pulmonary embolism to use a supplemental oxygen device
at work as a reasonable accommodation, even though the ailment did not constitute an actual disability);
Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 910, 914 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that a plaintiff with heart
disease required postponement of his relocation as a reasonable accommodation, even though his
condition did not constitute an actual disability).
209. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(c) (2000).
210. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000) (defining "qualified individual with a disability" as "an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires"); id. § 12112(b)(5)(A)
(prohibiting "not making reasonable accommodations to... an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability").
211. See D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc,, 422 F.3d 1220, 1235 (1
lth Cir. 2005) (concluding
that "a review of the plain language of the ADA yields no statutory basis for distinguishing among
individuals who are disabled in the actual-impairment sense and those who are disabled only in the
regarded-as sense"); Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003) ("On the
face of the ADA, failure to provide reasonable accommodation to 'an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability' constitutes discrimination. And, on its face, the ADA's definition of 'qualified
individual with a disability' does not differentiate between the three alternative prongs of the
'disability' definition." (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12111(8), 12112(b)(5)(A)) (citations
omitted)). The text of the statute also indicates that employers must accommodate all limitations
flowing from a disability, notjust those causally connected to a substantially limited major life activity.
See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
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However, federal appellate courts are divided on whether there is a duty to
accommodate employees regarded as disabled" 2 because some courts believe that
doing so would constitute unwarranted preferential treatment. According to the
Eighth Circuit, "The ADA cannot reasonably have been intended to create a
disparity in treatment among impaired but nondisabled employees, denying most the
right to reasonable accommodations but granting to others, because of their
employers' misperceptions, a right to reasonable accommodations no more limited
than those afforded actually disabled employees. 2 13 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that providing employees regarded as disabled with a right to reasonable
accommodation would constitute a "windfall," by making impaired employees
"better off under the statute if their employers treated them as disabled even if they
were not."'2 1 4 Do either of these arguments support the Felix limit on the disabilityrelated limitations an employer must accommodate?
In the words of the Eighth Circuit in Weber, 1 5 could the ADA reasonably have
been intended to create a disparity in treatment between disabled employees and
those impaired but not actually "disabled," allowing only the former to receive
accommodation for their impairment-related but nondisabling limitations? The
answer is yes. Any statute with a limited protected class inherently provides that
those falling within the class will receive the benefits of the statute while those
falling outside the class will not. Given that disability status turns on how limiting
an individual's impairment is, a slight difference in the amount of limitation can
make a great difference in terms of protection: some individuals will barely fall

212. Compare D'Angelo, 422 F.3d. at 1239 (holding that there is a duty to accommodate
employees who are regarded as disabled) and Kelly, 410 F.3d at 676 (same) and Williams v.
Philadelphia Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 773-76 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that "to the
extent [the employer] regarded him as disabled, [the plaintiff] was entitled to reasonable
accommodation") and Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996) (assuming there is such
a duty of reasonable accommodation), with Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1233 (holding that there is no duty to
accommodate employees regarded as disabled) and Weber, 186 F.3d at 917 (stating that the ADA was
not intended to provide reasonable accommodation to some moderately impaired employees, while
denying assistance to others based solely on an employer's misperception) andWorkman v. Frito-Lay,
Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999) (assuming that there is no such duty when an employee is
"'regarded as' having a disability") andNewberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir.
1998) (assuming that an employer's misperception does not create a duty to reasonably accommodate).
213. Weber, 186 F.3d at 917; see also Michelle A. Travis, Leveling the PlayingFieldor Stacking
the Deck? The "UnfairAdvantage"CritiqueofPerceivedDisabilityClaims,78 N.C. L. REv. 901,965
(2000) ("Granting perceived disability plaintiffs the full range of traditional, operational
accommodations advantages them over other nondisabled workers because perceived disability
plaintiffs are, objectively, already similarly situated with members of the nondisabled majority.").
214. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232. The Kaplan court's narrow interpretation of the duty of
reasonable accommodation is foreshadowed by the first sentence of its analysis. The court stated that
"[tjhe ADA represents a Congressional judgment that an individual's education, experience, will to
succeed, and adaptability may often overcome mere disability." Id. at 1229. This statement suggests
that disability is something inherent in the individual for that person to overcome, rather than a product
of the interaction between a person's impairment and an environment constructed around the norm of
an able-bodied worker. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination,Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA.
L. REv. 397,427-428 (2000) (contrasting the medical model of disability, which "treated disability as
an inherent personal characteristic that should ideally be fixed, rather than as a characteristic that draws
its meaning from social context," with the social model which "treats disability as the interaction
between societal barriers (both physical and otherwise) and the impairment"). The duty of reasonable
accommodation is based on the latter idea that sometimes the environment must change, an idea that
is absent from the Kaplan court's summary description of the ADA.
215. See Weber, 186 F.3d at 917.
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within the protected class, while others will barely fall outside the class.216 The
statute does not protect employees with impairments that do not substantially limit
a major life activity, even against irrational disparate treatment based on their
impairments. Accordingly, it is unpersuasive to argue that because employees
outside the protected class are not entitled to accommodation for limitations caused
by their impairments, Congress could not have intended employees who fall within
the protected class to receive accommodation for all of the limitations caused by
their disabling impairments.217 The fact that those outside the protected class receive
no protection should not be interpreted as reducing the protection received by those
within the protected class. On the contrary, the difficulty of establishing an actual
disability suggests that qualifying impairments are likely to limit individuals with
those impairments in numerous ways, not all of which will be causally connected
to a substantially limited major life activity.2"'
Moreover, the difficulty of establishing an actual disability indicates that
accommodating all of the disability-related limitations ofdisabled employees would
not provide them with a windfall. Individuals with disability-related limitations not
directly connected to their substantially limited major life activity are not similarly
situated to nondisabled individuals with impairment-related limitations, even ifboth
groups would benefit from the same accommodation in the workplace. Unless an
individual is disabled only in the major life activity of working,2" 9 the individual's
disability will also have a significant effect on life outside the workplace. In fact,
according to the Supreme Court, if the disability affects the individual only in the
workplace, then by definition the individual cannot be substantially limited in a
major life activity other than working.220 Any reasonable accommodation, ofcourse,
" ' Accordingly, it is incorrect to suggest
assists the individual only in the workplace.22
216. For example, an individual whose impairment restricts her to one to two hours of sleep per
night may be substantially limited in the major life activity of sleeping, while an individual whose
impairment restricts her to two to three hours of sleep per night may not be so limited. Compare Felix
v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 640, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that "Felix's chronic
inability to sleep was a substantial limitation of a major life acitivity"), with Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166
F.3d 1300, 1306 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that Pack failed to demonstrate that her impairment
substantially "limited her major life activity of sleeping").
217. Cf. Kelly v. Metallics West, Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 676 (10th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the
preferential treatment argument against accommodating employees regarded as disabled because "it
is in the nature of any 'regarded as disabled' claim that an employee who seeks protections not
accorded to one who is impaired but not regarded as disabled does so because of the additional
component-'regarded as' disabled").
218. See Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Rehearing En Banc at 14, Felix v.
N.Y. City Transit Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (No. 98 Civ. 5687 (SAS)) ("A medical
condition that is serious enough to substantially limit a major life activity will likely also limit the
individual in other ways, some or all of which affect the workplace.").
219. In such a case, it would seem that the Felix rule would allow the plaintiff to receive any
accommodation in the workplace because any accommodation would be causally connected to the
plaintiff's substantially limited major life activity. Notably, however, courts and the EEOC disfavor
working as a major life activity. See supra note 104.
220. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200-02 (2002).
221. According to the EEOC, ADA accommodations must be "job-related"; "if an adjustment
or modification assists the individual throughout his or her daily activities, on and off the job, it will
be considered a personal item that the employer is not required to provide." 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.
§ 1630.9 (2004). See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 35-37,
50-54 (2004) (identifying this rule as one significant way in which the antidiscrimination focus of the
ADA limits the statute's ability to eliminate the most deeply rooted structural barriers to the
employment of individuals with disabilities).
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that a disabled individual is somehow better off than a nondisabled individual
because only the former can obtain reasonable accommodation of nondisabling
limitations in the workplace. To qualify as an actual disability, one's impairment
must prevent or severely restrict performance of a significant activity or an activity
"of central importance to daily life." 222 Providing some adjustment to conventional
workplace structures only for actually disabled individuals does not constitute a
windfall.
However, questioning the significance of the disabled individual's substantially
limited major life activity makes granting a right to accommodation based on that
activity appear more like a windfall. Reproduction is, perhaps, the most criticized
major life activity. In his dissenting opinion in Bragdon, Chief Justice Rehnquist
contended that reproduction is unlike the activities contained in regulations issued
under the Rehabilitation Act and incorporated by reference in the ADA 223 : "caring
for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working."224 The common thread among those activities,
according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, is not their importance but that they "are
repetitively performed and essential in the day-to-day existence of a normally
functioning individual. 2 2 5 Numerous commentators have agreed that reproduction
is not a major life activity, referring to reproduction as a "lifestyle choice, 2 26
asserting that the inability to reproduce does not keep individuals "out of
' and contending
mainstream American life,"227
that "qualifying reproduction as a
major life activity . . . extends the ADA's protection to cover emotional,
personalized pain."228
Following Bragdon, some courts have held that unless an individual planned
on having children in the absence of the impairment, reproduction is not a major life
activity for that individual.229 In response to these cases, one commentator has

222. See supra notes 25-26, 32-35 and accompanying text.
223. 42 U.S.C. § 1220 1(a) (2000).
224. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 659 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 45
C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997)).
225. Id. at 660.
226. Sarah Lynn Oquist, Casenote, Reproduction Constitutes a "MajorLife Activity" under the
ADA: Implications of the Supreme Court's Decision in Bragdon v. Abbott, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv.
1357, 1415 (1999); see also Christiana M. Ajalat, Is HIVReally a "Disability"?: The Scope of the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct after Bragdon v. Abbott 118 S.Ct. 2196 (1998), 22 HARv. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 751, 763 (1999) (noting that "plenty of perfectly healthy, well-functioning people choose
not to reproduce").
227. Ajalat, supra note 226, at 763.
228. Timothy D. Johnston, Note, Reproduction Is Not a Major Life Activity: Implicationsfor
HIV Infection as a Per Se Disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
189, 254 (1999). According to Johnston,
(Tihe primary consequence of a reproductive impairment like infertility or HIV,
aside from the obvious physical consequences, comes in the form of the
disappointment, shattered dreams, embarrassment, and hopelessness that must
surely flow from discovering that one cannot enjoy the pleasures of fathering or
bearing his or her own child.
Id. at 253.
229. See, e.g., Blanks v. Sw. Bell Commc'ns, Inc., 310 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Because
Blanks does not want to have any more children, and because he fails to assert any facts to the contrary,
he does not raise a triable issue of fact to indicate that his HIV status substantially limited his major
life activity of reproduction."); Worster v. Carlson Wagon Lit Travel, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 257, 266
(D. Conn. 2005) ("In the absence of any specific evidence that plaintiff's alleged disability, rather than
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asserted that major life activities "should not vary from person to person" and that
the result of these cases is that "plaintiffs are encouraged to lie about whether they
intend to have children."23 Indeed, it seems odd that a hypothetical coworker of the
plaintiff in Wood-one who has the same work-related injury but does not intend
to have children and is either unwilling or unable23 ' to lie about that
intention-would not be entitled to any accommodation in the workplace. Yet, if
a person truly uninterested in reproduction is able to successfully assert an inability
to reproduce as a substantially limited major life activity, any accommodation
received by the individual would arguably constitute a windfall-the person would
receive a gain without sustaining a commensurate loss.
In fact, an individual's claim that reproduction is a major life activity for him
or her may appear least persuasive when the individual seeks a reasonable
accommodation unrelated to reproduction. Persons skeptical about reproduction as
a major life activity are likely to be less suspicious of plaintiffs claiming to be
substantially limited in that activity who seek only to avoid disparate treatment232
or who seek accommodations causally connected to their reproductive difficulties,
such as leave to obtain infertility treatment.233 In contrast, the Wood plaintiffs
request for accommodation of his lifting restrictions 234 may appear like someone
"seiz[ing] on the reproduction loophole to get [his] foot in the court's door."235
'
Many people will instinctively respond to the two factual scenarios presented
at the beginning of this Article by supporting the claim of the individual with
diabetes, who was substantially limited in eating and needed a device to assist her
in reading, but rejecting the claim of the individual with the back problem, who was
substantially limited in reproduction and needed to transfer to a position involving
no lifting. 236 As discussed above, this reaction likely reflects discomfort with the
concept of reproduction as a major life activity, rather than indicating the theoretical

other factors, circumscribed reproduction, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the impairment
significantly restricted his ability to reproduce."); Gutwaks v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 3:98-CV2120-BF, 1999 WL 1611328, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2,1999) ("Gutwaks' claim that he is substantially

limited in the activity of reproduction, when he professes no desire to ever father children, must fail.").
230. Jason M. Metnick, Evolving to Asymptomatic HIV as a Disability Per Se: Closing the
Loophole in JudicialPrecedent, 7 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 69, 92 (2003). However, the plaintiff
in Blanks would have been unlikely to succeed in such a lie because, following the birth of their
daughter and long before the plaintiffbecame HIV-positive, "his wife underwent a procedure to prevent

her from having any more children." Blanks, 310 F.3d at 401.
231. For example, the plaintiff may have been surgically sterilized or have experienced
menopause.
232. The Bragdon plaintiff, for example, sought equal treatment by the defendant dentist despite
her HIV-positive status. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 629 (1998).

233. For example, the plaintiff in Erickson v. Board of Governors claimed that her employer
discharged her because she took leave for fertility treatment. 911 F. Supp. 316, 318 (N.D. ll. 1995).
Interestingly, the plaintiff's claim was for disparate treatment-that her employer fired her for utilizing
her sick leave for infertility treatment rather than for some other medical condition. Id. She did not
contend that her employer needed to accommodate her disability by providing leave that her employer
did not provide to other employees. Id. at 320-22.
234. Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 339 F.3d 682, 684 (8th Cir. 2003).
235. Johnston, supranote 228, at 255. Aside from whether reproduction was an important activity
for the plaintiff, the plaintiff did not convince the Wood court that the impairment actually limited his

reproductive activity. See Wood, 339 F.3d at 686 ("We are hesitant to conclude that an unsubstantiated
declaration of Wood's difficulties with sexual relations creates a genuine issue of material fact as to
Wood being disabled.").
236. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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and practical soundness of the Felix rule. One can be concerned that claims like that
of the Wood plaintiff might give rise to preferential treatment and a windfall
without being convinced that employers should have a duty to accommodate only
limitations causally connected to a substantially limited major life activity.
The Supreme Court's opinion in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnet237 is also
instructive on the issue of whether the Felix limit on limitations is necessary to
avoid unwarranted preferential treatment of individuals with disabilities. In Felix,
the Second Circuit cited Barnett in support of the proposition that "[t]he ADA
mandates reasonable accommodation of people with disabilities in order to put them
on an even playing field with the non-disabled; it does not authorize a preference
for disabled people generally."23 However, the Supreme Court in Barnettrejected
the employer's argument that the duty of reasonable accommodation does not
require employers to grant preferential treatment to individuals with disabilities.239
According to the Court:
[T]he Act specifies, namely, that preferences will sometimes
prove necessary to achieve the Act's basic equal opportunity goal.
The Act requires preferences in the form of "reasonable
accommodations" that are needed for those with disabilities to
obtain the same workplace opportunities that those without
disabilities automatically enjoy. By definition any special
"accommodation" requires the employer to treat an employee with
a disability differently, i.e., preferentially.2"
After Barnett, characterizing a proposed reasonable accommodation as providing
preferential treatment to the disabled individual does not render the accommodation
unreasonable.241

In his dissenting opinion in Barnett, Justice Scalia articulated a narrower
interpretation of the duty ofreasonable accommodation, and the majority's rejection
of his interpretation further undermines the Felixrule. Justice Scalia contended that
an exception to a seniority rule could never be a potential reasonable
accommodation because "the ADA eliminates workplace barriers only ifa disability
prevents an employee from overcoming them--those barriers that would not be
barriers butfor the employee's disability. 2 42 According to Justice Scalia, unless the
requested accommodation "removes an obstacle . . . arising solely from the
disability," the ADA never requires accommodation.243 Justice Scalia's view of the

237. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
238. Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 2003).
239. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397-98.
240. Id. at 397.
241. See Carlos A. Ball, PreferentialTreatment and Reasonable Accommodation under the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 55 ALA. L. REv. 951, 952 (2004) ("The Court in Barnett for the first

time explicitly ruled that the ADA often requires that employers provide their disabled employees with
preferential treatment.").
242. Barnett,535 U.S. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 415. The Barnett plaintiff's insufficient seniority status to obtain the position he
sought was, Justice Scalia reasoned, an obstacle that had "nothing to do with his disability." Id. at 416.
Even though the plaintiff's disability rendered him unable to perform the duties of his former position,

such that he needed an exception to the seniority rules to remain employed, Justice Scalia considered
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very close causal connection needed between an employee's disability and
requested accommodation suggests that he might support the Felix rule. Like
seniority rules, impairment-related limitations not causally connected to a
substantially limited major life activity could be said to "burden[] the disabled and
nondisabled alike" and to "pose no distinctive obstacle to the disabled." 2" The
Barnett majority's implicit rejection of Justice Scalia's strict causation
requirement245 suggests that a disabled individual need not demonstrate a causal
connection between an impairment-related limitation and a substantially limited
major life activity.246
Moreover, recent scholarship on the ADA's duty of reasonable accommodation
supports an understanding of that duty as encompassing disability-related
limitations that have no causal connection to the substantially limited major life
activity. Several commentators have highlighted the similarities between the duty
of reasonable accommodation and Title Vii's prohibition of disparate impact
discrimination,247 which occurs when a facially neutral employment practice

disproportionately harms members of a protected class and is not job-related or
consistent with business necessity. 248 Prior to the enactment of Title VII, many
workplaces intentionally excluded women and racial minorities, causing
employment practices and work environments to develop according to a white male
norm.249 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,25° the Supreme Court first recognized that

the causal connection between the disability and the accommodation insufficient. See Vikram David
Amar & Alan Brownstein, Reasonable Accommodations Under the ADA: The Supreme Court in
Barnett, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 361, 365 (2002) ("The short of it is that if we remove Barnett's disability
from the picture, he would not need an exemption from the seniority policy, because he could fill and
perform other, more physical, jobs to which his current seniority level would entitle him.").
244. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 412, 413 (2002).
245. See Ball, supra note 241, at 966 n.89 ("The majority in Barnett, by failing to apply Justice
Scalia's causation standard, can be understood to have implicitly rejected it."); see also Giebeler v. M
& B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Barnett... recognized that the obligation to
'accommodate' a disability can include the obligation to alter policies that can be barriers to
nondisabled persons as well.").
246. Even though Barnett ultimately held that accommodation requests for reassignment that
conflict with seniority rules are ordinarily not reasonable, this holding provides no support for the Felix
rule. Barnett,535 U.S. at 393-94. In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized "the importance
of seniority to employee-management relations," a factor irrelevant to an analysis of what disabilityrelated limitations an employer must accommodate. Id. at 403. Barnett also involved reassignment to
a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation, "one of the most difficult and controversial of all
accommodation issues." Stephen F. Befort, ReasonableAccommodation andReassignment under the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Answers, Questionsand SuggestedSolutions afterUS Airways, Inc.,
v. Barnett, 45 ARIz. L. REv. 931, 933 (2003); see also Cheryl L. Anderson, "Neutral" Employer
Policiesand the ADA: The ImplicationsofUS Airways, Inc. v. Barnett Beyond Seniority Systems, 51
DRAKE L. REv. 1, 2 (2002) ("In a statute castigated by some for creating preferential rights for
individuals with disabilities, the reassignment provision raises particularly difficult issues."). In
contrast, the Felix rule potentially applies to all types of reasonable accommodations and not just
accommodations dealing with seniority and reassignment.
247.
See Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation As Part and Parcel of the
AntidiscriminationProject,35 RuTGERs L.J. 861,861-62 (2004); Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination
and Accommodation, 115 HARv. L. REv. 642, 669 (2001); Stein, supranote 75, at 636-37.
248. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A) (2000).
249. See Kathryn Abrams, GenderDiscrimination andthe TransformationofWorkplace Norms,
42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1191 (1989); Kelly Cahill Timmons, Sexual Harassment and Disparate
Impact: Should Non-Targeted Workplace Sexual Conduct Be Actionable under Title VII?, 81 NEB.
L. REv. 1152, 1208 (2003).
250. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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those practices-even when they were facially neutral-violated Title VII because
"they operate[d] to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices. ' ' Such practices "operate[d] as 'built-in headwinds' for minority
'
groups,"252
and equal employment opportunity required the "remov[al of] barriers

that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees. 253
Individuals with disabilities have also experienced intentional exclusion from
the workplace, causing employment practices and workplace environments to
develop according to the norm of an able-bodied worker.2 54 Like the disparate
impact theory of discrimination, the duty of reasonable accommodation views those
practices and environments as contingent rather than natural and thus subject to
change to meet the needs of disabled workers.255 Rather than providing disabled
individuals an unfair advantage over their nondisabled coworkers, accommodating
disabled workers levels the playing field because "[t]he practices and policies of
most employers are developed and implemented in such a way so as to take into
account the physical needs and limitations of able-bodied employees. 256
One could argue the analogy to disparate impact discrimination supports the
Felix rule. Workplaces were not constructed around a norm of a disabled
worker--one substantially limited in a major life activity-so a worker is entitled
to accommodations, or removal of barriers, related to that limitation.2 7 In Felix, the
251. Id. at 430.
252. Id. at 432.
253. Id. at 429-30.
254. See Crossley, supra note 247, at 915 (noting that "both the physical workplace and
conventional expectations about how job functions should be performed-while apparently
neutral-are products of a history in which persons with disabilities were shunned, ignored, and
excluded from the workplace"); Stein, supra note 75, at 598 (referring to "a status quo that has already
excluded disabled participation in the workplace").
255. See Crossley, supra note 247, at 863-64 (noting that "the primary barriers faced by people
with disabilities lie in how society has historically structured its institutions, attitudes, and physical
environments" and that "[r]easonable accommodations address this barrier, which in the context of
employment opportunity typically can be distilled down to the employer's implicit or explicit assertion
that 'that's just how we [meaning people without disabilities] do things in this workplace"'); Stein,
supra note 75, at 673 ("ADA-mandated accommodations are consistent with other antidiscrimination
measures because each remedies artificial exclusion from employment opportunity by questioning the
necessity of established workplace norms.").
256. Ball, supra note 241, at 960. Professor Ball reasons further that
equality of opportunity already exists for able-bodied individuals because
workplace practices are, as a matter of course, tailored to meet their needs and
interests. It is the needs of employees with disabilities that have traditionally been
ignored by employers, and it is for that reason that the ADA requires employers
to account for the disabilities of their employees in fashioning and implementing
employment related policies.
Id. at 990 (footnote omitted).
257. The similarities between the duty of reasonable accommodation and the disparate impact
theory of discrimination also provide some insight into the skepticism expressed by some courts about
individuals substantially limited in the major life activity of reproduction who request accommodation
in the workplace. See supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text. Does the standard structure of
workplaces and jobs conflict with the needs of persons with reproductive difficulties? According to
Professor Samuel Bagenstos, "[s]ociety's treatment of fertility and parenthood as 'normal' provides
reason to fear that people with infertility will suffer from prejudice and stereotypes and that social
institutions and structures will (if only inadvertently) deny them opportunities." Bagenstos, supranote
214, at 489. Bagenstos acknowledges, however, that "those fears do not appear to be realized equally
for all forms of 'infertility' and "whether a particular instance of 'infertility' is sufficiently
stigmatizing to constitute a 'disability"' depends on the underlying physical impairment "and the
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employer's failure to construct the workplace around a norm of a worker
substantially limited in sleeping would entitle the plaintiff to accommodation of her
sleeping difficulties. The nondisabled majority, however, includes workers with
impairment-related limitations that do not rise to the level of a substantial limitation
of a major life activity, and most workplace environments developed around that
majority.25 With regard to limitations not causally connected to a substantially
limited major life activity, the Felix plaintiff arguably is no different from the
nondisabled majority. In a case like Wood, one could argue that the nondisabled
majority includes many individuals with back problems who have restrictions on
their lifting ability.
However, the better argument is that leveling the playing field for individuals
with disabilities--eliminating the disability-related barriers to their equal
employment opportunity-requires accommodation of all limitations caused by a
disabling impairment, instead of only those causally connected to a substantially
limited major life activity. Jobs and workplaces developed according to the norm
of an able-bodied worker, one without physical or mental impairments.2" 9 Although
many workers with physical or mental impairments are deemed nondisabled under
the ADA because they fall outside the statute's narrow protected class, it is
incorrect to say that employers structured jobs and workplaces based on the abilities
and needs of workers who are impaired but not quite limited enough to be disabled.
The conventional structure of jobs and workplaces can have a disproportionately
harsh impact on workers other than those whose impairments substantially limit
them in a major life activity, although workers with such significant impairments
that the ADA deems them disabled are likely to face more barriers from existing
workplace conditions. Congress's choice to protect only the latter group of
employees--even though other employees could benefit from such
protection---does not suggest that Congress intended to allow employees with actual
disabilities to challenge only a narrow range of the disability-related barriers posed
by conventional workplace practices.26 °

There are many examples of disability-related limitations that are not causally
connected to a substantially limited major life activity but which, if not
accommodated, could clash with the typical structure of jobs and work
environments. As discussed previously, an individual with diabetes may be
measures that are likely to be necessary to overcome it." Id. at 489-90. Accordingly, the reproductive
limitation at issue in the Wood case-arising out of the plaintiff's back injury-may be less
stigmatizing and less removed from "the 'norm' for which social institutions and physical structures
are designed" than a reproductive limitation based on HIV-positive status. See id. at 446.
258. Cf Travis, supranote 213, at 965-66 (reasoning that "perceived disability plaintiffs-who
are really a part of the nondisabled majority-are among those who typically benefit from the
conventional workplace design" because their "nondisabling impairments are the type frequently
possessed by the correctly perceived nondisabled majority workforce" and asserting that "those with
actual disabilities.., are only accommodated for disabling impairments that the nondisabled majority
does not possess").
259. See Stein, supra note 75, at 640 (noting the assertion of disability rights advocates that "our
physical surroundings are structured to include an idealized bodily norm").
260. The Barnett majority opinion indicates that the scope of the duty of reasonable
accommodation is not limited by the fact that nondisabled employees could also benefit from a
proposed accommodation. See Giebeler v. M. & B. Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003)
(noting that Barnett "recognized that the obligation to 'accommodate' a disability can include the
obligation to alter policies that can be barriers to nondisabled persons as well").
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substantially limited in the major life activity of eating and also experience vision
problems or bouts of irritability caused by low blood sugar. An individual with renal
disease may be substantially limited in the major life activities of caring for one's
self or eliminating waste from blood26' and also be unable to lift heavy objects.262
An individual with Down Syndrome may be substantially limited in the major life
activity of thinking and also experience hearing problems. 263 An individual with
cerebral palsy may be substantially limited in the major life activity of performing
manual tasks and also experience difficulties in learning. 2" An individual with

obsessive-compulsive disorder may be substantially limited in the major life activity
of caring for one's self2 65 and also have difficulty switching between job tasks.266
Conventional practices could operate as exclusionary barriers or built-in
headwinds to the ability of these disabled individuals to succeed in the workplace,
while accommodating their limitations through an adjustment of those practices may
be inexpensive. Providing equipment to magnify material the employee is required
to read could accommodate a vision problem. To the extent that an employee's
irritability conflicts with a work rule requiring courtesy or cordial relationships
among coworkers, possible accommodations could include allowing the disabled
261. See Fiscus v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 385 F.3d 378,380,385-86 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that
plaintiff with end-stage renal disease-who "was required to undergo time-consuming and
uncomfortable dialysis treatments to cleanse and eliminate waste from her blood"-may have
experienced a substantial limitation in the major life activities ofeliminating waste from the blood and
caring for herself); Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637, 641 (2d Cir. 1991) ("We are inclined to view
persons whose kidneys would cease to function without mechanical assistance, or whose kidneys do
not function sufficiently to rid their bodies of waste matter without regular dialysis, as being
substantially limited in their ability to care for themselves.").
262. See Fiscus, 385 F.3d at 381 n.1 (noting the plaintiff, a baker/wrapper in a store's bakery
department, "need[ed] assistance with tasks that involved heavier lifting"); Gilbert, 949 F.2d at 638
(noting a physician stated that the plaintiff could only lift up to 25 pounds due to his polycystic kidney
disease). Mere inability to lift heavy objects is unlikely to constitute substantial limitation in the major
life activity of lifting. See supra notes 43 and 45 (discussing the difficulty of showing substantial
limitation in the major life activity of lifting).
263.
DOWN SYNDROME NSW, A LIFE WITH DOWN SYNDROME (1998),
http://www.dsansw.org.au/publications/ALifeWithDS.html ("70% of the adult population with Down
syndrome have mild hearing loss.").
264. See Emory v. Astrazeneca Pharm. LP., 401 F.3d 174, 183 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that
plaintiff with cerebral palsy "created a genuine issue of fact as to whether he is disabled in the major
life activities of performing manual tasks and learning"). The National Institute of Neurological
Disorders and Stroke defines cerebral palsy as "an umbrella-like term used to describe a group of
chronic disorders impairing control of movement." NAT'L INST. OF NEUROLOGICAL DISORDERS &
STROKE, NAT'LINST. OF HEALTH PUBL'N NO. 93-154, CEREBRALPALSY: HOPE THROUGH RESEARCH

(2001), available at http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/cerebral_palsy/detail-cerebral_palsy.htm.
Symptoms of cerebral palsy differ among persons and vary in severity but include difficulty with fine
motor tasks, difficulty maintaining balance and walking, and difficulty controlling involuntary
movements. Id. Mental impairment is often associated with cerebral palsy: "About one-third of
children who have cerebral palsy are mildly intellectually impaired, one-third are moderately or
severely impaired, and the remaining third are intellectually normal." Id. Accordingly, an individual
with cerebral palsy could be substantially limited in performing manual tasks but not in learning,
substantially limited in learning but not in performing manual tasks, substantially limited in both
activities, or not substantially limited in either.
265. See Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
a plaintiff who felt compelled to perform a series ofobsessive rituals and took "significantly more time
than the average person to accomplish the basic tasks of washing and dressing" was substantially
limited in the major life activity of caring for herself).
266. See Breen v. Dep't of Transp., 282 F.3d 839, 840, 842 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that a
plaintiff with obsessive-compulsive disorder had "difficulty in dealing with unexpected interruptions
in assigned tasks").
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employee to take a break to cool off when he becomes angry at work.26 7 Although

cases featuring a reasonable accommodation related to lifting often involve a
request for transfer to a vacant position,268 under some circumstances the requested
accommodation could be as simple as having a coworker perform the heavy lifting
only intermittently required by the plaintiff's current position.269 A supervisor may
be able to accommodate hearing problems merely by speaking louder and more
slowly or by providing instructions in writing rather than verbally. Allowing an
employee limited in learning to take oral rather than written tests or providing
increased time to perform administrative tasks could constitute a reasonable
accommodation. 270 Finally, an employer could accommodate the difficulty of an
employee in switching between job tasks by providing a period during the work271day
when the employee could concentrate on one task without any interruptions.
The fact that disability-related limitations are not so restrictive as to constitute
a substantial limitation of a major life activity may make them easier to
accommodate.272 Of course, the costs of any accommodation will vary based on the
particular circumstances of each disabled individual, job, and workplace, and
sometimes an accommodation will be unreasonable because its cost exceeds its
benefit. It seems likely, however, that accommodating a "secondary" limitation of
a disabled individual will often be less costly than accommodating the substantial
limitation that renders the individual disabled under the ADA. For example, a
supervisor may be able to accommodate an individual whose Down Syndrome
causes a moderate reduction in hearing simply by speaking louder and more slowly,
whereas if the individual were substantially limited in hearing, the supervisor may
be completely unable to communicate orally with her-requiring a more
burdensome accommodation. The Felix rule would require the employer to

267. For examples ofother possible accommodations that may help employees avoid disabilityrelated violations of conduct rules and for an argument that sometimes a second chance to comply with
conduct rules is a reasonable accommodation, see Kelly Cahill Timmons, AccommodatingMisconduct
Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 57 FLA. L. REv. 187, 286-93 (2005).
268. See, e.g., US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (involving a cargo handler who
sought transfer to a vacant position); Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 339 F.3d 682,684 (8th Cir. 2003)
(involving a truck driver who was terminated because no vacant position existed); Nuzum v. Ozark
Auto. Distribs., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 852, 857-58 (S.D. Iowa 2004) (involving an injured picker who
failed to identify a vacant position).
269. Reassignment of the heavy lifting to a coworker would not be a reasonable iccommodation,
however, if that lifting is an essential function of the plaintiff's job. See Bratten v. SSI Servs., Inc., 185
F.3d 625, 632-33 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that the duty of reasonable accommodation does not require
employers to reassign essential functions of a disabled employee's job).
Professor Michael Stein makes the important point that the accommodation of reassignment of
marginal tasks, while not requiring an easily quantifiable out-of-pocket expense, nonetheless involves
soft costs, which might include having "a human resource manager meet with other employees to
explain the change in their daily duties" or requiring a supervisor "to learn how to take these alterations
into consideration when evaluating overall job performance." Stein, supra note 75, at 646 n.295.
270. See Emory v. Astrazeneca Pharm. LP., 401 F.3d 174, 177 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that the
plaintiff needed to have test questions read aloud to him and that the plaintiff "was frequently criticized
for.., the length of time it took him to complete administrative tasks").
271. See Breen v. Dep't of Transp., 282 F.3d 839, 840-41 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that the
plaintiff raised an issue of fact as to the reasonableness of her proposed accommodation of allowing
her time to do solid filing after business hours, which "would have permitted her to complete her filing
without the interruptions she found difficult to deal with as a consequence of her obsessive-compulsive
disorder").
272. See supra text accompanying notes 165-67.
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accommodate the employee's disability-related hearing problems only when those
problems rise to the level most difficult to accommodate-when the problems
constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of hearing. This narrow
interpretation of the scope of the duty of reasonable accommodation would cause
more employees to confront the Catch-22 between "disability" and "qualified,"
where if they are limited enough to be disabled, they are unlikely to be able to
perform the essential functions oftheirjob even with reasonable accommodation. 73
While many accommodations may be simple and relatively inexpensive, they
are accommodations nonetheless because they involve adjusting the work
environment to fit the disabled individual. A simple prohibition on disparate
treatment would allow employers to terminate disabled employees who could not
perform satisfactorily under their standard structure ofjobs and work environments,
even though that structure developed based on a norm of a worker without physical
or mental impairments. The Felix rule-requiring accommodation only of
limitations causally connected to a substantially limited major life
activity-removes some disability-related barriers but leaves many others standing.
Finally, although the analogy to disparate impact discrimination does not
support the Felix rule, it does suggest there should be some limit on the disabilityrelated limitations an employer must accommodate.274 Under the disparate impact
theory of discrimination, not all impacts are sufficiently adverse to be actionable.275
According to the Supreme Court, the challenged employment practice must
disqualify members of the protected class at a "substantially higher rate" than
persons outside the class.276 Similarly, employers should have a duty only to
accommodate disability-related limitations when the conventional workplace
practice or structure poses a substantial barrier to the disabled individual.277 Under
this interpretation, to receive accommodation, individuals must be substantially
limited in their ability to function under the employer's standard mode of operation.
For example, an employer must accommodate a disability-related vision problem
by providing the disabled individual with magnification equipment for reading only
if the employee is substantially limited in reading required material without the
equipment. Under the facts of Felix, for the plaintiff to challenge the requirement
that office-duty railroad clerks work in the subway on an as-needed basis, she would

273. Under the Felix rule, if a plaintiff with diabetes wants to request a reasonable
accommodation for her irritability during periods of low blood sugar, she must assert that interacting
with others is her substantially limited major life activity. If she is substantially limited in that major
life activity, however, she will likely be unqualified for mostjobs. See supranote 51 and accompanying
text.
274. Professor Mary Crossley makes this point in her article comparing reasonable
accommodation and disparate impact. See Crossley, supra note 247, at 954.
275. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1488 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Title VII is not meant to
protect against rules that merely inconvenience some employees... [but rather] protects against only
those policies that have a significant impact."); see also Timmons, supra note 249, at 1224-25
(discussing various approaches as to the requisite level of disparity).
276. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,426 (1971).
277. Cf. Crossley, supra note 247, at 953-54 (supporting "a middle ground approach to the
question of when an accommodation that removes a barrier to equal workplace opportunity for a
disabled individual is reasonable," which "could recognize the psychological or stigmatic impact that
even seemingly trivial barriers may have, while simultaneously acknowledging that not every barrier
demands an employer response").
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have to prove that her PTSD substantially limited her ability to comply with that
rule.
Requiring a substantial conflict between the employee's disability-related
limitation and the challenged employment practice reduces the concern that
accommodating all of the limitations of disabled individuals grants them
unwarranted preferential treatment. Moreover, the need for a substantial conflict
may be particularly important when the requested accommodation relates to
workplace conduct rules. If an employee's disability makes it only slightly more
difficult for him to comply with a conduct rule, adjusting the rule only for that
employee may seem unfair, and doing so provides the employee with little incentive
to attempt compliance., Accordingly, an employee would not be entitled to a
cooling-off period as a modification of a conduct rule mandating courtesy to
coworkers if,absent such a period, his ability to comply with the rule is only slightly
limited. An employee with diabetes may be able to demonstrate substantial
limitation in her ability to comply with a work rule allowing meal breaks only at
certain times, requiring modification to that rule as a reasonable accommodation.
However, if the employee could obtain her manager's permission to go into the
back room when she needs to eat something, she might not be substantially limited
in her ability to comply with a work rule prohibiting employees from consuming
anything while in view of customers. Accordingly, the employee would not be
entitled to a reasonable accommodation excusing her from complying with the rule
prohibiting eating in front of customers.279 In short, disabled individuals cannot
assert that the slightest breeze constitutes a built-in headwind to their success in the
workplace-an argument that seems likely to provoke resentment among other
employees.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Felix limit on limitations may initially appear to be an appropriate answer
to "the great unsettled question under the ADA" 2s -the scope of the duty of
reasonable accommodation. Given that what places an individual within the ADA's
protected class is an impairment substantially limiting a major life activity, it seems
logical that employers should have a duty to accommodate only limitations causally
connected to that activity. After all, nondisabled individuals may also have
impairment-related limitations, yet they have no right to accommodation. Granting
disabled individuals a right to accommodation of all limitations raises the specter
of preferential treatment rather than a level playing field.
However, closer scrutiny reveals that the Felix opinions misinterpret both
precedent and the text of the ADA. Moreover, the Felix limit on limitations is

278. See Timmons, supra note 267, at 258-59. On the other hand, requiring the employee to
prove that the disability compelled him to violate the rule-rather than substantially limited his ability
to comply with the rule--conflicts with the reality of many impairments, particularly mental ones. See
id. at 257-58.
279. Note that this requirement of a substantial conflict between the employee's disability-related
limitation and the challenged employment practice applies even when the limitation is causally related
to the employee's substantially limited major life activity-in this example, eating.
280. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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inconsistent with the policies underlying the statute. As highlighted by the
scholarship comparing the duty of reasonable accommodation to disparate impact
discrimination, Congress's intent in imposing the duty of reasonable
accommodation was to remove unnecessary barriers to equal employment of
disabled individuals. These barriers-which exist because standard workplace
policies and structures developed based on a norm of a worker without physical or
mental impairments-often exclude disabled individuals due to disability-related
limitations that are not causally connected to a substantially limited major life
activity. It may impose little burden on an employer to provide to an individual with
OCD, who is substantially limited in caring for herself, a period during the work
day to concentrate on one task without interruption. Because switching betweenjob
tasks is not a major life activity, under the Felix rule, the employee could obtain her
needed accommodation only by asserting substantial limitation in working. Even
if the employee could make that difficult showing, the Catch-22 between
"disability" and "qualified" would likely bar her from the ADA's protected class.
Barriers to equal employment opportunity also may exist for individuals with
nondisabling impairments, but the lack of protection for those outside the ADA's
protected class does not dictate less protection for those within the protected class.
Rather, the difficulty of establishing an actual disability indicates that individuals
with disabling impairments are likely to face numerous limitations due to those
impairments, some of which will not be causally connected to a substantially limited
major life activity. Moreover, the Supreme Court's opinion in Barnettestablished
that a proposed accommodation is not necessarily unreasonable either because it
could be characterized as providing preferential treatment to the disabled individual
or because nondisabled employees could also benefit from the proposed
accommodation. Concern about preferential treatment is better addressed by
requiring a substantial conflict between the individual's disability-related limitation
and the challenged workplace practice or structure. Requiring such a conflict also
reinforces the similarities between the duty of reasonable accommodation and
disparate impact discrimination.
The Felix limit on limitations is not only an incorrect interpretation of the duty
of reasonable accommodation-it is also a dangerous one. One of Congress's goals
in enacting the ADA was to encourage an interactive process between employers
and employees where both would share information and come to an agreement
about accommodations. 2 ' The Felix rule, however, gives employers an incentive
to resist the accommodation requests of many disabled individuals, asserting that
even if the individual falls within the ADA's protected class, the requested

281. See Jackan v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 205 F.3d 562, 566 (2d Cir. 2000) ("The ADA
envisions an 'interactive process' by which employers and employees work together to assess whether
an employee's disability can be reasonably accommodated."); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2005) ("To
determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to
initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified individual with a disability in need of the
accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and
potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations."); Karlan & Rutherglen,
supra note 57, at 19 (asserting that "the interaction of individualized litigation with individualized
compliance is particularly significant under the ADA").
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accommodation
is unrelated to the individual's substantially limited major life
282
activity.

Cases that purport to follow the Felix limit on limitations, but actually present
much easier issues," 3 are particularly dangerous. Courts may agree with those
cases' common sense results and decide that the Felix rule must be correct. Then,
in cases involving a controversial impairment-such as mental impairments like
PTSD, or a controversial major life activity, like reproduction-courts may use the
Felix rule to substantially restrict the protections provided to certain disabilities. 8 4
Congress viewed the duty of reasonable accommodation as essential to the
ADA's goal of equal employment opportunity for individuals with disabilities. The
Felix limit on limitations significantly restricts the ability of disabled
individuals-particularly those with disfavored disabilities-to access that
protection. Because the Felix rule leaves many unnecessary disability-related
barriers standing, it must be rejected.

282. A fairly standard accommodation is allowing an individual time during the work day to take
medication. See, e.g., Amos v. Wheelabrator Coal Servs., Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 798, 801 (N.D. Tex.
1998) (stating that the plaintiff's employer "accommodated him by allowing him breaks to take
medication"). Under the Felix rule, an employer may resist even that accommodation request unless
the individual can demonstrate that the medication treats the part of the impairment that substantially
limits a major life activity, rather than another limitation caused by the impairment.
283. See supra notes 170-81 and accompanying text.
284. As discussed supra notes 223-35'and accompanying text, the concept of reproduction as
a major life activity presents some difficulties. More troubling is the reasoning of theFelix court, which
reflects a suspicion about mental impairments as disabilities worthy of the ADA's full protection, even
though the statute expressly covers both physical and mental impairments. See supranotes 140-56 and
accompanying text. Under the Felix rule, to receive necessary accommodations for their disabilityrelated limitations, individuals with mental impairments may need to assert substantial limitation in
thinking, interacting with others, or working, thus risking exclusion from the ADA's protected class
due to the Catch-22 between "disability" and "qualified." See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying
text.
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